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Memory protection is necessary to ensure the correctness of data in the
presence of unavoidable faults. As such, large-scale systems typically employ
Error Correcting Codes (ECC) to trade off redundant storage and bandwidth
for increased reliability. Single Device Data Correction (SDDC) ECC mecha-
nisms are required to meet the reliability demands of servers and large-scale
systems by tolerating even severe faults that disable an entire memory chip.
In the future, however, stronger memory protection will be required
due to increasing levels of system integration, shrinking process technology,
and growing transfer rates. The energy-efficiency of memory protection is also
important as DRAM already consumes a significant fraction of system energy
budget. This dissertation develops a novel set of ECC schemes to provide
strong, safe, flexible, and thorough protection against existing and emerging
types of DRAM errors. This research also reduces energy consumption of such
protection while only marginally impacting performance.
vii
First, this dissertation develops Bamboo ECC, a technique with stronger-
than-SDDC correction and very safe detection capabilities (≥ 99.999994% of
data errors with any severity are detected). Bamboo ECC changes ECC lay-
out based on frequent DRAM error patterns, and can correct concurrent errors
from multiple devices and all but eliminates the risk of silent data corruption.
Also, Bamboo ECC provides flexible configurations to enable more adaptive
graceful downgrade schemes in which the system continues to operate correctly
after even severe chip faults, albeit at a reduced capacity to protect against
future faults. These strength, safety, and flexibility advantages translate to a
significantly more reliable memory sub-system for future exascale computing.
Then, this dissertation focuses on emerging error types from scaling
process technology and increasing data bandwidth. As DRAM process tech-
nology scales down to below 10nm, DRAM cells are becoming more vulnerable
to errors from an imperfect manufacturing process. At the same time, DRAM
signal transfers are getting more susceptible to timing and electrical noises
as DRAM interfaces keep increasing signal transfer rates and decreasing I/O
voltage levels. With individual DRAM chips getting more vulnerable to errors,
industry and academia have proposed mechanisms to tolerate these emerging
types of errors; yet they are inefficient because they rely on multiple levels
of redundancy in the case of cell errors and ad-hoc schemes with subopti-
mal protection coverage for transmission errors. Active Guardband ECC and
All-Inclusive ECC make systematic use of ECC and existing mechanisms to
provide thorough end-to-end protection without requiring redundancy beyond
viii
what is common today.
Finally, this dissertation targets the energy efficiency of memory pro-
tection. Frugal ECC combines ECC with fine-grained compression to pro-
vide versatile and energy-efficient protection. Frugal ECC compresses main
memory at cache-block granularity, using any left over space to store ECC
information. Frugal ECC allows more energy-efficient memory configurations
while maintaining SDDC protection. Its tailored compression scheme mini-
mizes insufficiently compressed blocks and results in acceptable performance
overhead.
The strong, thorough, and efficient protection described by this disser-
tation may allow for more aggressive design of future computing systems with






List of Tables xiv
List of Figures xv
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Errors with Growing System Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Limitations of Current SDDC Protection . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Contribution w.r.t. Errors in Future Large-Scale Systems 4
1.2 Errors from Less-Reliable Process Technology . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 In-DRAM ECC Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Limitations of In-DRAM ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Contribution w.r.t. Scaling-Induced Errors . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Errors from Less-Reliable Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Current Transmission Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Limitations of Current Transmission Protection . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Contribution w.r.t. Transmission Errors . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Protection Energy Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.1 Limitations of Current Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.2 Contribution w.r.t. Energy Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Dissertation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chapter 2. Background 14
2.1 Reliability Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 DRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Error Correcting Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
x
Chapter 3. Data Errors Protection Mechanisms 22
3.1 Data Error Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 ECC Detection Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Bamboo ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.1 Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1.1 Single Pin Correcting ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1.2 Single Pin Correcting – Triple Pin Detecting ECC 30
3.3.1.3 Quadruple Pin Correcting ECC . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.1.4 Octuple Pin Correcting ECC . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Graceful Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.3 Overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.1 Error Coverage Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.2 System Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4.3 Performance and Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Chapter 4. Mechanisms against Manufacturing Faults 57
4.1 DRAM Faults from Process Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 In-DRAM ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 ECC Guardband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.1 Strict ECC Guardband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3.2 Zero ECC Guardband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.3 Active ECC Guardband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Active Guardband QPC ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.1 ECC decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.2 Fault Diagnosis and Erasure Decoding . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4.3 Remapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.4 Overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5.1 Manufacturability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
xi
4.5.2 System Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5.3 Performance and Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Chapter 5. Mechanisms against Command/Address Errors 89
5.1 DRAM Transmission Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 Current DRAM Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 DDR4 CCCA Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.2 DDR4 Reliability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 All-Inclusive ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3.1 Extended Data ECC for Address Protection . . . . . . . 98
5.3.2 Extended Write CRC for Timely Write Address Protection100
5.3.3 State and Timing Checker for Command Protection . . 101
5.3.4 Extended CA Parity (eCAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.5 Clock and Control Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.6 Precise Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3.7 Correction Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.4.1 CCCA Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4.1.1 Impact of undetected CCCA errors . . . . . . . 108
5.4.1.2 Detection Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4.2 Data Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.3 System Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.4 Hardware Overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Chapter 6. Efficient Protection using Compression 123
6.1 Frugal ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2 Coverage-oriented Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2.1 Fitting Base + Delta Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2.2 Floating-point Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xii
6.2.3 Frequent Word Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.3 ECC Flag Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.4 Frugal ECC Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.4.1 Frugal ECC for x4 SDDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.4.2 Frugal ECC for ×8 SDDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.5.1 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.5.2 Compression Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.5.3 Performance and Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.5.4 Hardware Overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.6.1 Efficient ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.6.2 Memory Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Chapter 7. Conclusion 157





2.1 Examples of ECCs with different distances. . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 DRAM fault rates (in FIT) observed on the Jaguar supercom-
puter with 73K DDR2 DIMMs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 A comparison of the protection coverage of bit-level ECCs. . . 41
3.3 A comparison of the protection coverage of SDDC ECCs with
×4 and ×8 DRAM devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Traditional approaches for high reliability and high manufac-
turability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 A comparison of protection coverage using different QPC post-
processing schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 The performance/energy simulation parameters of AG-ECC. . 83
5.1 DDR4 DRAM commands with their allowed bank state and
timing constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2 The impact of 1-pin CCCA errors across pin locations and com-
mands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3 A comparison of the data and address protection coverage of
Bamboo QPC with and without address protection. . . . . . . 112
5.4 Representative benchmark clusters and their bandwidths. . . . 114
5.5 An evaluation of mean time to CCCA SDC failure on systems
with 1.2M and 36M DRAM devices and high bandwidth uti-
lization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1 The frequent word compression mappings (per 64-bit data). . 132
6.2 A comparison of different SDDC and SDDC-level ECCs for ×4
devices over a 64-bit data channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.3 A comparison of different SDDC and SDDC-level ECCs for ×8
devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4 The simulation parameters for the performance and energy eval-
uation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
xiv
List of Figures
1.1 The increasing DRAM transfer rates of command, address, and
data signals over the past 15 years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 The decreasing DRAM supply voltage levels. . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 DRAM power breakdown over core and I/O. . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 The standard fly-by topology of DDR4 registered DIMM. . . . 8
2.1 The hierarchical organization of DRAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Conceptual codespace of single symbol correcting codes. . . . . 26
3.2 Single Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on (64+2)-bit channel . . 30
3.3 Single Pin Correcting – Triple Pin Detecting Bamboo ECC on
(64+4)-bit channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Quadruple Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on (64+8)-bit channel 31
3.5 Octuple Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on a (128+16)-bit channel. 33
3.6 The protection coverage and system reliability evaluation envi-
ronment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.7 The failure probability of a DDR 64-bit data channel over time
with different bit-level protection mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . 44
3.8 The failure probability of a DDR 64-bit data channel over time
with different SDDC protection mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.9 The failure probability of a DDR 128-bit data channel with
different DDDC protection mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.10 The failure probability of a large system with 1,000,000 channels
over time with different SDDC protection mechanisms. . . . . 47
3.11 The failure probability of a large system with 1,000,000 channels
over time with different DDDC protection mechanisms. . . . . 48
3.12 The execution time slowdown of Bamboo ECC schemes (nor-
malized to AMD chipkill). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.13 The SEC-DED codeword over (64+8)-bit channel / 1-beat. . . 51
3.14 The interleaving of 4 SEC-DED codewords over 288 bit channel
/ 1-beat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
xv
3.15 The interleaving of 2 SEC-DAEC codewords over 144 bit chan-
nel / 1-beat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.16 The 4-bit Symbol SDDC (SSC-DSD) over (128+16)-bit channel
/ 1-beat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.17 The 8-bit Symbol SDDC (SSC) over (64+8)-bit channel / 2-beat. 54
4.1 In-DRAM ECC for DRAM chips with different data interface
widths but the same 12.5% redundancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 A strict ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC. . 63
4.3 A zero ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC. . . 64
4.4 An active ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC. 68
4.5 A comparison of 16GB DIMM yields using different ECC schemes
and varying cell fault rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6 A comparison of the number of spare 64B blocks needed to
achieve 99.99% yield on 16GB DIMMs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.7 The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent
and operational faults (CFR = 10-6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.8 The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent
and operational faults (CFR = 10-5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.9 The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent
and operational faults (CFR = 10-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.10 A comparison of the IPC slowdown comparison between AG-QPC
and in-DRAM-ECC-based schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.11 A comparison of the DRAM energy efficiency between AG-QPC
and in-DRAM-ECC-based schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 A read address error example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 A write address error example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.3 A command error example (duplicate activations). . . . . . . . 92
5.4 The CCCA signal interface for DDR4 memory. . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5 The reliability features available with DDR4. . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.6 A visualization of the extended Data ECC (eDECC) mechanisms. 99
5.7 An overview of the Extended Write CRC (eWCRC). . . . . . 101
5.8 An overview of the Command State and Timing Checker. . . . 101
5.9 An overview of the Extended CA Parity (eCAP). . . . . . . . 104
5.10 The CCCA reliability evaluation environment. . . . . . . . . . 106
xvi
5.11 The CCCA error detection coverage of an unprotected DDR4
DIMM (None), DDR4+DECC (DECC), DDR4+eDECC (eDECC),
and DDR4+AIECC (AIECC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.12 A quantitative evaluation of the different AI-ECC components:
eDECC, eWCRC, address protection (eDECC+eWCRC), CSTC,
eCAP, command protection (CSTC+eCAP), eDECC+eWCRC
+eCAP (for completeness), and AI-ECC. . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.13 An estimation on ×4 DRAM CCCA FIT rates after protection
with 10-22 BER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1 A comparison between Frugal ECC and existing ECC. . . . . 124
6.2 Memory reads and writes with Frugal ECC using a 64-bit non-
ECC DIMM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3 The compressed data layout for the 448-bit target (64-bit re-
dundancy). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4 The compressed data layout for the 480-bit target (32-bit re-
dundancy). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.5 The Frugal ECC layout for AMD chipkill and QPC Bamboo ECC
(64-bit redundancy). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.6 The Frugal ECC layout for ×4 Multi-ECC (32-bit redundancy). 134
6.7 Probabilities of a DUE and SDC for a single rank with 1 or
2-chip errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.8 Probabilities of a DUE and SDC for a system with 100K DIMMs,
assuming only 1 or 2-chip errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.9 An evaluation on CoC compression coverage for 64-bit and 32-
bit redundancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.10 A compression coverage comparison between CoC and prior
memory compression schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.11 The memory traffic and compression coverage results of all bench-
marks measured with Pin and the four representative detailed
simulations selected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.12 A comparison of execution time and DRAM energy consump-
tion (normalized to AMD chipkill). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149




DRAM errors are not rare. Field measurements show that a DRAM
Dual Inline Memory Module (DIMM) suffers from an average of 0.65 − 330
errors per month [122, 48, 128, 129, 93, 127]. In large-scale systems with tens
of thousands of DIMMs, these numbers translate into significant system-wide
error rates. On the Jaguar supercomputer with 18K nodes and 73K DDR2
DIMMs, there are 250,000 DRAM errors per month on average, or there is
a DRAM error once every 10 seconds [128]. With such frequent errors, the
output of a large-scale computation is unreliable and the reliability of main
memory has become a significant and growing concern of system designers and
operators.
Large-scale systems, datacenters, and business-critical servers currently
employ Error Correcting Codes (ECC), which trade off redundant storage and
bandwidth for improved reliability. The most widely known ECC is Single
Error Correcting — Double Error Detecting (SEC-DED), which can correct
all 1-bit errors and detect all 2-bit errors. On 64-bit data, 8-bit redundancy
is added for SEC-DED. The standard ECC DIMM has 8 redundant pins with
64 data pins, resulting in 12.5% redundant storage and transfer.
1
Highly reliable systems require stronger levels of protection. Single
Device Data Correction (SDDC) ECC1 can restore data of a dead chip and can
tolerate more severe errors than SEC-DED. Field analyses report that SDDC
significantly improves memory reliability by correcting 99.94% of all errors,
compared to 91% with SEC-DED [50], and achieves a 42× better uncorrected
DRAM error rate than SEC-DED [128]. Recent SDDC implementations use
the same ECC DIMMs originally designed for SEC-DED [9].
While SDDC protection brings needed reliability improvements to cur-
rent large-scale systems, future systems will require even stronger error cor-
rection and detection capabilities due to three main reasons: growing system
sizes, less-reliable process technology, and increasing transmission error rates.
Also, energy-efficiency of protection is important because ECC costs extra
chips that consume a significant portion of a system’s energy budget. Further-
more, ECC often necessitates energy-inefficient configurations. The following
sections briefly describe these DRAM reliability challenges, current approaches
that address those challenges, limitations of these current approaches, and the
contributions of this dissertation.
1.1 Errors with Growing System Sizes
The number of DRAM devices per system is rapidly growing to support
exploding data volumes and computation throughput. The U.S. Department of
1SDDC is referred to as Chipkill, extended ECC, and ChipSpare protection by IBM, Sun
(now Oracle), and HP, respectively [9, 53, 108, 42].
2
Energy expects exascale supercomputers, which are capable of a billion billion
calculations per second, to be available by 2024 [94]. Such supercomputers
may employ millions of DRAM DIMMs for more than 128 peta bytes of main
memory [124]; this number of DRAM devices is 32× greater than the top
supercomputer in 2016 [139].
1.1.1 Limitations of Current SDDC Protection
The correction and detection strength of current SDDC protection may
not be sufficient to deal with the growing system integration levels and their
higher error rates. The mean time between uncorrectable errors in current
systems with SDDC protection is as low as 9 days [93]. Without a stronger
correction capability, future systems will suffer from degraded system-level
reliability with an uncorrectable error every few hours.
The detection capability of a protection scheme is as important as its
correction capability in large-scale computing. ECC has limited correction
capability due to physical constraints (e.g., the amount of redundancy) and
large-scale systems typically employ runtime support (e.g., checkpoint and
restart [38, 27]) to correct rare ECC-uncorrectable errors. Such schemes mostly
rely on ECC detection capability to trigger the state-restoration procedure
so that uncorrectable errors, if any, should at least be detected by ECC to
prevent applications from producing incorrect results. Despite the importance
of detection, some SDDC implementations trade off detection capability for
improved efficiency, missing up to 1.4% of double-chip-errors (Section 3.4).
3
1.1.2 Contribution w.r.t. Errors in Future Large-Scale Systems
This dissertation presents a novel family of efficient ECC mechanisms
for future large-scale systems. Bamboo ECC reduces service interruptions
from uncorrectable errors by correcting more pin and chip errors than state-of-
the-art SDDC mechanisms. Bamboo ECC also provides vastly superior detec-
tion capability against errors with any severity and eliminates the risk of silent
data corruption to ensure safe system operation. As permanent faults gener-
ate more serious and uncorrectable errors with accumulation, Bamboo ECC
provides fine-grained pin-level flexibility to aggressively retire such faults with
minimal cost, thereby extending system lifetime.
1.2 Errors from Less-Reliable Process Technology
Shrinking process technology will make individual DRAM devices more
vulnerable to errors. As DRAM technology continues to scale down to below
10nm, smaller transistors, capacitors, and wire pitches make DRAM cells more
vulnerable to smaller defects, retention errors, and disturbance errors, respec-
tively [70, 85, 82]. Current row and column sparing techniques fall short of
screening out all the faulty cells, so these repeated and permanent errors can
increase error rates even further, and can make error patterns more severe
when faults that affect the same memory region accumulate over time.
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1.2.1 In-DRAM ECC Protection
In response, industry and academia have been exploring alternatives
that are based on integrating ECC within DRAM chips [68, 14, 81, 85, 70, 67,
107]. In-DRAM ECC works by reading and processing redundant informa-
tion within the DRAM chip, commonly allocating 6.25% or 12.5% additional
bits for each memory read or write. By keeping this ECC processing and
redundancy within each chip, the DRAM external interface remains mostly
unchanged. In-DRAM ECC allows a memory chip to present itself to the pro-
cessor as a reliable part even if inherent scaling faults exist, enabling future
DRAM devices to be manufactured with high yield.
1.2.2 Limitations of In-DRAM ECC
While in-DRAM ECC mitigates the issue of inherent faults at the
boundary of a single device, its use within the context of highly-reliable systems
raises an issue of increased redundancy compared to current practice. Highly-
reliable systems already utilize ECC across a memory rank2 (rank-level ECC)
to protect against operational memory faults. As opposed to inherent faults,
which exist when the system is first run, operational faults occur while the
system operates (as a result of particle strikes, signaling errors, aging, etc.).
Rank-level ECC commonly requires 12.5% redundancy in the form of redun-
dant chips added to each rank. Thus, with in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC
2A memory rank is a set of DRAM chips accessed simultaneously to provide the desired
channel data width.
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both applied, the combined storage redundancy grows to 26.6% (1.125 ×
1.125 = 1.266).
1.2.3 Contribution w.r.t. Scaling-Induced Errors
This dissertation provides strong and efficient protection against both
inherent and operational faults. Active Guardband ECC (AG-ECC) utilizes
a novel and unique combination of ECC decoding and memory remapping
that simultaneously achieves high efficiency, high reliability, and high yield.
AG-ECC uses a strong rank-level ECC to tolerate both errors during operation
and errors from imperfect process technology, eliminating the need for separate
in-DRAM ECC protection against faulty cells. It not only restores the total
amount of redundancy back to 12.5%, compared to up to 26.6% overhead in the
proposed in-DRAM + rank-level ECC approaches, but also provides higher
yield than in-DRAM ECC. AG-ECC can maintain reliability stronger than
SDDC mechanisms available in current systems and significantly improves
DRAM energy efficiency.
1.3 Errors from Less-Reliable Transfers
DRAM transfers are getting more vulnerable to transmission errors.
DRAM has consistently evolved to provide more data with less energy. Each
recent generation of DRAM has more-than-doubled the data transfer rate of
its predecessor (Figure 1.1), and has also decreased core and I/O voltages

















Figure 1.1: The increasing DRAM transfer rates of command, address, and



















































Figure 1.3: DRAM power break-
down over core and I/O.
lowering I/O voltages each exacerbate the problem of transmission errors. A
transmission error occurs when a signal is incorrectly transferred to or from
memory; higher transfer rates and lower voltages increase the vulnerability to
timing and electrical noise, respectively.
While current protection techniques primarily focus on protecting data
transmissions, Clock, Control, Command, and Address (CCCA) signals should
not be neglected. These signals typically operate at half the transfer rate of
data signals, yet they may suffer from more transmission errors due to DIMM





















Figure 1.4: The standard fly-by topology of DDR4 registered DIMM.
18 DRAM chips sequentially and 27 CCCA signals are captured using a clock
signal. On the other hand, each data signal has a dedicated connection and
there is a strobe signal per up to 8 data signals. The larger number of re-
ceivers and the wider interface deteriorate CCCA signal quality by increasing
reflections and signal skew, respectively, making CCCA transfers potentially
more vulnerable to errors than data transfers despite the halved transfer rate.
Signal and power integrity simulations on DDR4 registered-DIMM show that
CCCA signals have a narrower time window to reliably receive signals than
data signals. Also, evidence from a large-scale field study [127] strongly sug-
gests that CCCA errors are already a severe problem for reliability-conscious
systems, even at the modest 1.6 Gbps CCCA rate of DDR3.
1.3.1 Current Transmission Protection
Traditionally, DRAM designs have managed the transmission error rate
using sophisticated circuit techniques to improve signal quality (e.g., delay-
locked loops, phase-locked loops, on-die termination, differential signaling, and
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fly-by topology [56, 59, 60, 61, 66]) at the cost of consuming extra power. The
price paid for reliable transmission is significant because roughly half of DRAM
power is spent on I/O (Figure 1.3) [120]. Increasing transfer rates and tight
power constraints have made circuit techniques alone insufficient to provide
high levels of reliability and efficiency.
As a result, DRAM vendors have introduced ad-hoc architectural tech-
niques in recent memory generations to protect transfers, such as Cyclic Re-
dundancy Check (CRC) and Command/Address Parity (CAP) [60, 61, 66].
The 8-bit CRC on write data verifies the consistency of received data, while
an even-parity on command/address signals verifies the consistency of received
command/address. Once errors are detected by such schemes, they can be cor-
rected by retransmitting the signals.
1.3.2 Limitations of Current Transmission Protection
CAP provides limited detection capability of CCCA errors; it can de-
tect only odd bit errors on command/address signals. Errors on clock and
control signals (e.g., chip select and clock enable) and even-bit errors on com-
mand/address signals are not detected by CAP. Such errors can have disas-
trous impact that is not correctable by conventional data-only ECC, leaving
a serious hole in system reliability.
Due to the lack of strong protection and the severity of the problem, re-
cent DRAM generations passively limit CCCA rates for high reliability. DDR4
introduced gear-down mode which transfers CCCA signals at a quarter the
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rate of data for reliability [60] and GDDR5X could not scale up CCCA rates
along with data rates [66] (Figure 1.1). These designs trade off performance
for CCCA reliability by lowering command bandwidth, adding command la-
tency, and increasing access granularity—all of which degrade performance
and efficiency.
1.3.3 Contribution w.r.t. Transmission Errors
This dissertation presents All-Inclusive ECC (AI-ECC), a holistic mem-
ory error protection scheme that is able to safeguard DRAM data and CCCA
signals against storage and transmission errors. Strong protection on any one
component (i.e., data) provides limited benefits to overall reliability as any
unprotected component will quickly become the reliability bottleneck. There-
fore, current data-oriented ECC should be redesigned to thoroughly protect
both data and CCCA. By leveraging the existing strong ECC schemes for the
protection of CCCA errors, AI-ECC remedies the approach of protecting only
or mostly DRAM data without discarding the extensive advancements made
in the area of data protection.
1.4 Protection Energy Efficiency
In addition to the heightened need for stronger protection, energy ef-
ficiency of memory protection should be improved. DRAMs already consume
more than 30% of total power in modern datacenters [97], and ECC over-




of the DRAM energy consumption.
1.4.1 Limitations of Current Protection
Current SDDC ECCs increase DRAM energy consumption even further
by forcing energy-inefficient memory configurations. SDDC mechanisms rely
on narrower DRAM devices (e.g., 16 ×4 chips per channel) to reduce the num-
ber of affected bits from a chip failure and/or a wider channel (e.g., two ECC
DIMMs in parallel) to increase redundancy amount. Narrow devices double
the number of chips per access than energy efficient configurations with wider
devices (e.g., 8 × 8 chips per channel) and roughly double the DRAM energy
consumption per access. While a wider channel can increase the amount of
redundancy per access, its larger access granularity often also results in a se-
rious performance degradation due to overfetching and reduced memory-level
parallelism. Fujitsu reports that pairing two 64b channels together in an 8
DIMM system to form four 128b data channels degrades integer application
performance (SPECint2006 [130]) by 6% and memory-intensive benchmark
(STREAM [43]) performance by 43%. The performance hit is even more stag-
gering on a lower capacity node—with 4 DIMMs, the performance degradation
for the integer and memory benchmarks are 28.3% and 46.3%, respectively [32].
1.4.2 Contribution w.r.t. Energy Efficiency
This dissertation improves energy efficiency of main memory protection
as well as protection strength. Frugal ECC (FECC) is an adaptive and strong
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ECC technique that relies on opportunistic compression to offer an entirely
new set of tradeoffs between reliability and ECC overheads. The insight behind
FECC follows recent research which observes that compression at the cache-
block granularity can free up enough space for other information [89, 123];
FECC uses this free space for storing the ECC redundancy. Thus, when
compression succeeds, FECC can match the performance of a conventional
ECC organization that uses dedicated ECC memory devices with less, or even
zero, dedicated redundancy.
While the concept is simple, two crucial innovations are introduced to
make FECC truly effective. First, a new compression scheme maximizes the
fraction of blocks that compress just enough for ECC rather than needlessly
aiming for greater levels of compression. The second innovation is how to
protect poorly compressed blocks. Not all memory blocks are sufficiently com-
pressible and some blocks fail to yield enough spare footprint for the redundant
information. To address these compression exceptions, FECC applies different
ECC layouts and protects its layout meta-data separately to guarantee up to
true SDDC protection.
This careful combination of compression and ECC layout simultane-
ously achieves superior reliability and lower overhead when compared to state-
of-the-art ECC mechanisms. As an example, this dissertation presents the first
true SDDC ECC on a narrow channel (i.e., single ECC DIMM) with wider de-
vices (i.e., 8-bit wide DRAM chips) to reduce the number of DRAM chips per
access and to improve DRAM energy efficiency.
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1.5 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 lays
out the conceptual foundations of this dissertation by reviewing the terminol-
ogy and function of system reliability, DRAM, and ECCs. Chapter 3 develops
strong ECC mechanisms against data errors. Chapter 4 introduces errors from
imperfect process scaling and presents strong and efficient protection. Chap-
ter 5 discusses transmission errors and provides thorough protection on data
and CCCA signals. Chapter 6 presents mechanisms to improve energy effi-
ciency of protection using fine-grained compression. Chapter 7 summarizes




This chapter reviews the concepts and terminology that are fundamen-
tal and common to the mechanisms of this dissertation: reliability concepts,
DRAM, and ECC. More detailed motivations of particular mechanisms will
be provided at the beginning of its corresponding chapter: data errors patterns
(Section 3.1), inherent faults from process scaling (Section 4.1), and transmis-
sion errors (Section 5.1).
2.1 Reliability Concepts
As a matter of terminology: a fault is a physical phenomenon or defect
that may cause an error, an error is a discrepancy between the intended and
actual state of a system, and a failure is the event that a system deviates from
its intended service [15]. A fault may or may not generate an error depending
on circumstances, and an error can be masked or corrected by error control
systems. The aim of this research is to efficiently provide such an error control
system to prevent DRAM errors from developing into a system failure.
Faults can be classified based on their error manifestation and time of
occurrence. A transient fault is introduced by some temporary environmental
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impetus (e.g., a high-energy particle strike), whereas a permanent fault is
an irreversible physical defect that continually produces errors (e.g., stuck-
at bit) [128]. An inherent fault is a permanent fault introduced during the
manufacturing process, and an operational fault is a fault during operation
(either transient or permanent).
Reliability indicates continuity of service without a failure, often mea-
sured in Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) or Failures In Time (FIT, the num-
ber of failures in billion hours), and manufacturability indicates the ease with
which a good product can be manufactured, measured in yield. A fault may
affect reliability by incurring failures and an inherent fault may decrease man-
ufacturability by making a chip defective. The aim of this dissertation is to
efficiently provide fault tolerance mechanisms using Error Correcting Codes
(ECC) to prevent DRAM faults from developing into a system failure or re-
sulting in poor yield.
No error control system can diagnose and correct all possible errors.
In general, an error control system handles an error in one of four ways: a
Detectable and Correctable Error (DCE), a Detectable but Uncorrectable Error
(DUE), a detectable but miscorrected error, or an undetectable and uncor-
rectable error. In the event of miscorrection or misdetection, incorrect data
escapes the error control system, resulting in a possible Silent Data Corrup-
tion (SDC) failure. The implication of a DUE failure can vary depending
on circumstances. A DUE during transmission can typically be corrected by
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(e) A DRAM rank and memory trans-
fer block.
Figure 2.1: The hierarchical organization of DRAM.
age, a DUE indicates that some data has been lost. This loss of data could
be acknowledged and tolerated (by an error tolerant application), it may be
corrected by some higher-level protection mechanisms (such as checkpoint and
restart [38] or a hierarchical state preservation and restoration system [27]),




Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is widely used as system
main memory for its low cost and high density. The deeply hierarchical struc-
ture of DRAM is depicted in Figure 2.1. A DRAM cell stores each bit of
data using a single transistor and a capacitor (Figure 2.1a). DRAM cells are
organized into two-dimensional arrays, called banks, to amortize control over-
heads (Figure 2.1c). At a deeper look, each bank is physically sub-divided into
512×512 cell mats (Figure 2.1b) to reduce load capacitance and all data within
neighboring mats are connected to one data pin for efficiency [142, 83, 60, 33].
A DRAM chip (or a device) consists of multiple banks to interleave per-bank
accesses and hide long access latency (Figure 2.1d).
Most DRAMs use multiple data pins (DQs) to provide a parallel chip
interface. A DRAM with an N-bit DQ interface is called a ×N chip (e.g.,
a ×4 or ×8 DRAM); the set of DRAM chips that are accessed together in
parallel to provide the desired data bus width is called a rank (Figure 2.1e). A
channel is a set of ranks that time-share physical command/address and data
transfer lanes. A rank/channel comprises of Dual In-line Memory Modules
(DIMMs) that are built from multiple DRAM chips on a PCB board. A rank
can consist of a single DIMM (e.g., a ×64 rank using a ×64 DIMM) or multiple
DIMMs (e.g., a ×128 rank using two ×64 DIMMs in parallel), and a DIMM
can contain multiple ranks (e.g., a ×64 DIMM contains two ×64 ranks).
DRAM requires three commands to access a fresh piece of data. An
activation command (ACT) fetches a row of data into an internal row buffer.
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Then, a read or write command (RD or WR) uses a column address to select
and transfer or overwrite a particular block from the activated row. To ex-
ploit data locality and amortize command overheads, an RD or WR transfers
a block of data over multiple cycles—one beat of data is transferred through
the rank at a time. The number of beats transferred during each access is
called the memory burst length, and most recent DRAMs use a burst length
of 8. A Memory Transfer Block (MTB) is the unit of memory access and is
defined by burst length and channel data width; typical MTB sizes from burst
length of 8 and ×64/×128 channels are 64B/128B, respectively (Figure 2.1e).
Once a memory read or write completes, the DRAM bank must be restored
to a ready state by issuing a precharge command (PRE). An access to an
already-activated row (a row buffer hit) does not require an ACT or PRE
command, potentially saving latency and command bandwidth for spatially
local accesses. However, command bandwidth can be a limiting factor for
programs lacking locality, especially in systems featuring fine-grained access
granularities [10, 152, 153, 117]. Furthermore, DRAM requires periodic re-
fresh commands (REF) to prevent data loss from leakage, further taxing the
available command bandwidth.
2.3 Error Correcting Codes
Error Correcting Codes (ECC) have long been used to protect data
against errors. ECC detects and corrects errors by adding redundant informa-
tion whose value is generated algorithmically from the protected data. A data
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and check value pair is called an ECC word. A valid word whose check bits
are consistent with its data is called a codeword, while an invalid pair due to
errors is called a non-codeword. The process of generating a codeword from
data is called encoding and the process of detecting errors from a word and
(possibly) restoring the original data is called decoding.
The protection strength of an ECC can be defined by its correction
and detection coverage: X-correcting and Y -detecting codes can correct all of
up to X errors and detect all of up to Y errors. These protection coverages
can be theoretically extracted from the code distance: in information theory,
the Hamming distance between two words of equal length is the number of
positions at which their symbols differ, and the code distance is the minimum
Hamming distance between two distinct codewords. Codes with distance d,
if used for detection only, can detect all errors with less-than-d erroneous
symbols (i.e., (d− 1)-detecting codes), because these errors always result in a
non-codeword. Alternatively, the same codes can detect and correct all errors
with less-than-�(d−1)/2� erroneous symbols (i.e., �(d−1)/2�-correcting codes)
by decoding a non-codeword into the nearest unique codeword.
Table 2.1 illustrates some examples of ECCs with different distances.
In the figures, double-circles represent codewords; each diagram shows two
neighboring codewords that are colored black and white. Black and white
single-circles are non-codewords that are corrected to the codeword of the
corresponding color. Codes with distance 3 can correct all single-symbol errors
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Table 2.1: Examples of ECCs with different distances.
with distance 4 can make a word equally distant from two codewords (gray
single-circle); in that case the error is detectable yet uncorrectable. A typical
ECC scheme uses a t-symbol correcting and (t + 1) symbol detecting codes,
which is effective in systems where errors accumulate symbol-by-symbol. Once
the erroneous symbol count exceeds the correction capability, it will still be
within the detection boundary.
ECCs can be categorized based on their symbol sizes. Binary ECCs
use binary symbols and are most effective at protecting against random bit
errors. Hamming [37] and BCH codes [44, 20] can correct a single erroneous
bit in w bits of data using �log2(w+1)� redundant bits (and they can detect
one more bit-error by adding a parity bit).
Non-binary ECCs partition data into fixed-size symbols; error detection
and correction then occur at the symbol granularity. The most widely used
non-binary ECCs are Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [116], which can achieve the
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minimum possible redundancy for a given distance [125]. RS codes with 8-
bit symbols can correct up to t symbol errors using 2t redundant symbols
(and they can detect one more symbol error using an additional symbol) on
up to 255-symbol (2040-bit) words; many SDDC schemes [9, 41] use 8-bit
symbol RS codes because of the efficiency. As most memory configurations
do not fully utilize such large word sizes, however, these SDDC schemes use
smaller words and regard the remaining symbols as zeros (i.e., a shortened
code).1 AI-ECC (Chapter 5) leverages the shortened nature of SDDC schemes
to strongly protect address information without any additional redundancy.
The correction capability of RS codes can be increased using a priori
knowledge about an error. Compared to a random error whose location and
value are unknown, an erasure has its location known in advance (e.g., based
on error history). Erasure decoding of RS codes can restore t symbol erasures
using t redundant symbols, doubling the correction efficiency relative to ran-
dom error decoding. AG-ECC (Chapter 4) utilizes erasure decoding to correct
rare cases of overlapping inherent and severe operational faults, while either
fault alone is corrected by random error decoding.
1Current 8-bit RS SDDC schemes use anywhere from 18 symbols [9] to 144 symbols [77].
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Chapter 3
Data Errors Protection Mechanisms
This chapter presents and evaluates a novel family of efficient single-
tiered ECC mechanisms, called Bamboo ECC, for future large-scale systems.
The advantages of Bamboo ECC can be roughly characterized by three im-
portant improvements. Strength: Bamboo ECC has superior correction ca-
pabilities and can correct more pin and chip errors than the state-of-the-art
single-tiered ECC mechanisms, while requiring the same or less redundant
storage and off-chip bandwidth. Safety: The vastly superior detection capa-
bility of Bamboo ECC all but eliminates the risk of silent data corruption with
currently observed fault modes, ensuring safe system operation. Flexibility:
Bamboo ECC can increase redundancy at 8b granularity, compared to 8B for
the state-of-the-art SDDC techniques; this fine-grained redundancy allows for
more adaptive graceful downgrade schemes (i.e., memories with faulty devices
can continue operation with reduced-strength codes), further improving both
reliability and system lifetime. When combined into a system context, these
Parts of this chapter appear in [77]. The author is the main contributor of the idea,
implementation, and evaluation.
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improvements can lead to orders of magnitude fewer silent data corruptions
or greatly extended system lifetime.
Three main insights lead to the innovative code design. First, many
faults manifest errors on a single data pin (DQ) due to the DRAM internal
structure (e.g., a mat fault) or the DRAM external interface (e.g., a faulty data
pin). Secondly, aligning ECC symbols to prevalent error patterns allows for
more frequent corrections. Finally, while an ECC code guarantees detection of
errors up to a certain severity, careful analysis reveals that some codes provide
superior detection capabilities beyond these guarantees. These insights are
described in more details below.
3.1 Data Error Patterns
Recent field studies of DRAM faults [122, 87, 48, 128, 129] indicate that
memory errors follow some idiosyncratic trends due to the deeply hierarchical
structure of DRAM (Section 2.2). DRAM cell arrays are sub-divided into
512 × 512 cell mats and all data within neighboring mats are connected to a
single DQ for efficiency [142, 83, 60, 33]. Therefore, a local fault commonly
generates errors over a single DQ.
Table 3.1 presents DRAM fault rates observed in the Jaguar supercom-
puters with ×4 DDR2 chips [128]. It indicates that about half of all faults
(49.6%) affect only a single bit. More importantly, 72.6% of all faults and
68.2% of permanent faults are confined to a single DQ. Furthermore, this
analysis is likely to underestimate the true likelihood of a single DQ error
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within an access for methodological reasons, as intermittent single-DQ faults
that are separated in time may be classified as multi-DQ faults.1 Finally,
the majority of all faults (71.0%) are permanent, indicating even more severe
errors may accumulate. These findings show that the need for strong ECCs
to protect against accumulating faults, especially the accumulation of single
DQ faults over time. Bamboo ECC focuses on this important single-DQ fault
mode to improve correction capability.
3.2 ECC Detection Coverage
This section presents theoretical background on how Bamboo ECC im-
proves detection coverage to eliminate SDCs even in very large scale systems
(e.g., exascale computing) without increasing the redundancy ratio. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents theoretical correction and detection coverages of ECC. A
code with distance d, if used for detection only, can detect all errors with
fewer than d erroneous symbols, or detect and correct all errors with fewer
than �(d−1)/2� erroneous symbols. Errors that exceed the theoretical cover-
age of a code can either be detected (resulting in a DUE) or they can lead to
an SDC failure.
Another motivation of Bamboo ECC is that, in practice, the error de-
1The observation that single-DQ errors are dominant is supported by other measure-
ments. IBM reports that 91% of erroneous beats have a single bit corrupted [50], and other
results from Jaguar report that 2-bit correction provides only marginally better correction
coverage than 1-bit correction; both of these results indicate that errors tend to be confined
to a single DQ.
24
Fault Mode
Number of failing DQs Fault Rate





















































































Table 3.1: DRAM fault rates (in FIT) observed on the Jaguar supercomputer
with 73K DDR2 DIMMs.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual codespace of single symbol correcting codes.
tection coverage of all error codes is not equal: in general, scaling-up ECC
codeword size (increasing codeword length, redundancy and correction capa-
bilities proportionally) is associated with higher error detection coverage for
severe errors. For example, two single-symbol correcting codes can be merged
into a double symbol correcting one. While the latter can correct all of the
errors that the former can, its larger codeword bestows stronger error detec-
tion capabilities. By maximizing its ECC word size, Bamboo ECC can safely
reduce the SDC probability for severe errors down to ≤0.0000006%, without
requiring more redundancy than what is currently available on a single ECC-
DIMM.
An example illustrates why the practical error detection coverage of
26
an ECC code is determined by its word size. Figure 3.1 shows a conceptual
codespace for a distance 3 (or Single Symbol Correcting (SSC)) code. A double
circle indicates a valid codeword (CW) and a single circle indicates an erro-
neous non-codeword. A ball of Hamming Distance (HD) d represents all words
that are d symbols different from a CW. If there is a single symbol error in a
CW, the erroneous word is on the HD=1 (innermost) ball and the SSC code
can always restore the original data by finding the nearest CW. If there are
two symbol errors, the erroneous word is on the HD=2 ball and the error will
be miscorrected to a neighboring CW if and only if it also falls on the HD=1
ball of the neighbor; otherwise, the error will result in a DUE. Note that the
theoretical coverage of this code is not double symbol detection as there exists
this potential for miscorrection. From a practical coverage perspective, how-
ever, the ratio of the number of miscorrections to the total number of words
on each ball decreases with larger ECC word sizes as the code space becomes
increasingly sparse. Thus, it can be seen that the error detection of a code
for errors beyond its guaranteed coverage is maximized with the ECC word
length. Likewise, three symbol errors on the HD=3 (outermost) ball may be
undetected (if they fall on a neighboring CW), miscorrected (if they fall on
another HD=1 ball), or they are otherwise detected. Again, it can be seen
that the error detection of a code for errors beyond its theoretical coverage
increases with the ECC word length.
High error detection of severe errors is fundamental for Bamboo ECC
to ensure safe system operation. Therefore, all of our analyses in Section 3.4.1
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are performed using real ECC decoding behavior in order to capture the prac-
tical error detection coverage of the codes for errors beyond their worst-case
protection guarantees. This is in contrast to other studies that characterize
system failure rates using only the worst-case behavior of ECC codes [54, 118].
An important observation of Bamboo ECC is that, in practice, silent data cor-
ruption can be eliminated without resorting to expensive ECC with high worst-
case error detection coverage. By manipulating the size of the Bamboo ECC
codeword and by matching code layout with expected fault modes, SDC rates
can be extensively reduced without introducing additional redundancy or con-
straints on the memory channel size.
3.3 Bamboo ECC
Bamboo ECC protects the burst of data from a DQ to provide stronger
correction and detection with equal or less redundancy than previously pro-
posed ECC mechanisms. The following subsections describe the motivation,
operation, and overheads of Bamboo ECC in greater detail. Section 3.3.1 de-
scribes some useful Bamboo ECC organizations. Section 3.3.2 shows how the
flexibility of Bamboo ECC can be utilized to provide superior levels of pro-
tection over the lifetime of a system. Finally, Section 3.3.3 describes the cost




Bamboo ECC changes ECC layout to have per-DQ symbols over a
memory transfer block. It groups the data of a single DQ as an ECC symbol;
on a conventional 8-beat memory transfer block of DDR3/4, a per-DQ symbol
has 8 bits of data. By aligning ECC symbols to frequent single-DQ faults,
Bamboo ECC reduces the number of symbols to be corrected in the common
case and requires less redundancy to correct common errors. The 8-bit sym-
bols are encoded by a Reed Solomon code to achieve the minimum possible
redundancy for its level of correction (i.e., 2 redundant symbols per symbol
correction, Section 2.3). The per-DQ symbols also increase the ECC word
size to a memory transfer block. This large ECC word can detect almost all
severe errors, while resulting in manageable increases in decoding complexity
and latency (Section 3.3.3).
Bamboo ECC is a family of codes. With per-DQ symbols, Bamboo ECC
introduces redundancy at pin granularity and provides finer control over cor-
rection and detection capabilities compared to previous ECC mechanisms with
per-chip symbols. The following subsections describe some of the efficient
Bamboo ECC organizations. Other organizations can be used to meet differ-
ent memory system constraints and reliability requirements.
3.3.1.1 Single Pin Correcting ECC
The simplest Bamboo ECC is the Single Pin Correcting (SPC) orga-



























Figure 3.2: Single Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on (64+2)-bit channel
pins. SPC requires just a quarter of the redundant storage of SEC-DED on
a 64b data channel (3.1% vs. 12.5%) yet it provides a better correctable er-
ror rate.2 One issue with SPC concerns the fixed granularity of commercial
DRAM chips–while memories such as embedded DRAM (eDRAM) have the
data width flexibility to support SPC, off-the-shelf memory chips are typically
×4 or ×8 DDR. Employing SPC with these chips will result in an inefficient
use of pins and storage. Even on commodity DRAM chips, however, SPC can
be efficiently employed as a component of a graceful degradation scheme, as
described in Subsection 3.3.2.
3.3.1.2 Single Pin Correcting – Triple Pin Detecting ECC
An extra ×4 DDR chip can provide 4 redundant Bamboo ECC symbols
(Figure 3.3). This redundancy can be used as either a Double Pin Correcting
(DPC) or Single Pin Correcting - Triple Pin Detecting (SPC-TPD) scheme;
2SPC misses some SEC-DED-correctable error patterns. However, Subsection 3.4.2
shows that SPC has better uncorrectable error rates due to the rarity of these patterns






















































Figure 3.4: Quadruple Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on (64+8)-bit channel
SPC-TPD usage has a very high detection coverage, detecting 100% of up-to-
3-pin errors and ≥99.9996% errors beyond this point, and is thus preferred.
The stronger correction capability of DPC, on the contrary, is less helpful as
faults affecting exactly 2 pins are infrequent (a field measurement on 2-bit
symbol correction [128] showed little improvement over SEC-DED) while it
can increase the SDC probability by aggressively miscorrecting severe errors.
SPC-TPD can be configured as a (64+4)-DQ configuration over a 64-bit data
channel, halving the redundancy of SEC-DED (6.25% vs. 12.5%).
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3.3.1.3 Quadruple Pin Correcting ECC
Bamboo ECC can provide stronger-than-SDDC protection with equal
redundancy to state-of-the-art SDDC schemes by using a Quadruple Pin Cor-
recting (QPC) organization. With two redundant ×4 chips, QPC has 8 redun-
dant symbols (Figure 3.4) and can correct up to 4 symbol errors or any single
chip-error. QPC can be configured in a (64+8)-DQ manner over a 64-bit data
channel, in which case the redundant storage needs match those provided by
conventional ECC DIMMs (12.5%). This storage efficiency for single-tiered,
narrow-channel SDDC is only paralleled by the AMD chipkill scheme used
in recent processors. QPC enjoys a stronger correction capability than AMD
chipkill by correcting pin errors that are scattered over different chips. If there
are two pin faults on two chips, QPC can correct both of them while AMD
chipkill must report a DUE (or, in some cases, AMD chipkill results in SDC).
As single-DQ faults are prevalent, this distributed error correction capabil-
ity can reduce uncorrectable error rates significantly. In addition, QPC has
a stronger detection capability due to its large codeword size. This leads to
QPC detecting ≥99.9999994% of all errors. A more in-depth comparison of
the two ECC schemes is evaluated in Section 3.4.
One optimization to QPC is to limit its correction capability to reduce
SDC rate even further, in a manner similar to the history mechanism used by
AMD chipkill [9]. AMD chipkill uses the history of corrected symbol locations
within each access to reduce SDC rates. If corrected symbol locations differ


























Figure 3.5: Octuple Pin Correcting Bamboo ECC on a (128+16)-bit channel.
and reports a DUE. The rationale behind this decision is that errors on dif-
ferent chips over a single access are very rare so that the symptom is likely
to have been generated from miscorrections arising from a severe error. Sim-
ilarly, QPC pessimistically reports a DUE if the diagnosed pin errors are not
confined to a single chip or to two pins on different chips.
3.3.1.4 Octuple Pin Correcting ECC
Bamboo ECC can correct errors on two ×4 chips or one ×8 chip by cor-
recting 8 pin symbols. Octuple Pin Correcting (OPC) Bamboo ECC achieves
8 pin correction with 16 redundant pins, resulting in a 25% overhead on a 64-
bit data channel or a 12.5% overhead on a 128-bit data channel (Figure 3.5).
OPC is optimized in a manner similar to that of QPC and limits its correction
capability to 2 chip errors or 4 independent pin errors to reduce the SDC rate.
3.3.2 Graceful Downgrade
The plethora of attractive organizations above allows a Bamboo ECC-
based system to more fully utilize redundant bit steering (RBS) than existing
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ECC schemes. RBS is a graceful downgrade scheme proposed by IBM [21] and
uses parts of the ECC check bits as hot spares, remapping faulty pins through
these spares. The state-of-the-art RBS-based protection is Double Device Data
Correction (DDDC)+1 from Intel, which can tolerate two sequential chip fail-
ures and a bit failure over a 128-bit data channel (Section 3.5). A gracefully
downgrading Bamboo ECC-based system can correct more initial chip faults,
more sequential chip faults, more end-of-life faults and has a better end-of-
life detection capability than DDDC+1. In addition, a gracefully degrading
Bamboo ECC system can diagnose and remap errors at the pin granularity,
offering slower degradation for accumulating pin errors than a system that op-
erates on coarse-grained symbols. Such a gracefully degrading Bamboo ECC
scheme is described below.
OPC over a 128-bit data channel uses the same amount of redundancy
(12.5%, or 16 pin symbols) as DDDC+1. After a chip retirement, the available
redundancy decreases to 12 pins, but Bamboo ECC can still operate in hextuple
pin correcting mode to correct up to 6 pin errors. Successive pin errors can be
diagnosed and retired at the pin granularity–a luxury that non-Bamboo ECC
codes do not enjoy.
After the available spare pins are exhausted due to further pin or chip
retirement, the redundancy of the Bamboo ECC-based system decreases down
to 8 pins, which is sufficient for QPC. Finally, following a third round of pin or
chip retirement, the system can downgrade to SPC-TPD using the remaining
4 redundant (non-spare) pins. Due to the storage efficiency of SPC-TPD, the
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Bamboo ECC-based system will still be able to correct a pin error and detect
≥ 99.9996% of errors. As a result, this graceful downgrade scheme can correct
two concurrent chip errors in its initial OPC phase and then can correct up to
1 sequential chip error and 1 pin error. It can also handle finer grained errors,
retiring faulty bits or pins as they accumulate.
Bamboo ECC-based graceful downgrade enjoys superior flexibility, and
can be modified to work on a narrower channel. For a system with a 64-bit
data channel, QPC (using 8 redundant pins) can be gracefully downgraded
to SPC-TPD (with a 4 pin redundancy), correcting a sequence of 1 chip error
and 1 pin error or up to 5 sequential pin errors while detecting most end-of-life
errors.
3.3.3 Overheads
The large ECC symbols and codewords of Bamboo ECC provide strong
and efficient error protection at the expense of decoding complexity and la-
tency. This section examines these costs, showing that the additional imple-
mentation overheads of Bamboo ECCs are modest and well-aligned to current
technological trends. It is demonstrated later that Bamboo ECCs incur little
performance overhead, and is expected that their memory bandwidth savings
(for the same level of protection) will outweigh their costs.
Circuit overhead: RS codes with 8-bit symbols have modest encoding and
decoding overheads to have a wide range of commercial applications, ranging
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from CDs to satellites. AMD chipkill uses 8-bit RS codes with 16 data symbols
and 2 redundant symbols; a corresponding fully parallel encoder requires 6
XOR2 gates of delay and consumes an area equivalent to about 1, 600 NAND2
gates.3
With larger codewords, Bamboo ECCs have larger encoding/decoding
overheads. Specifically, a fully parallel encoder for QPC (64-symbol data +
8-symbol redundancy) is 8 XOR2 gates deep, which is 2 gates more than AMD
chipkill yet is still easily implementable within a single memory cycle (1.2GHz).
Even the most complex Bamboo ECC presented, OPC with 128-symbol data
and 16-symbol redundancy, requires only 10 logic levels. The fully parallel
QPC encoder consumes about 25,000 NAND2 gates of area, a ×16 increase
over that of AMD chipkill. DRAM data, however, does not arrive at the chip
in an extremely wide parallel interface, rather transfers over multiple cycles,
and as such narrower pipelined RS encoder [26] can be used to reduce the area
of the encoder. Using a simplified gate-level model, a 16-way parallel QPC
encoder derived from [26] is estimated to require 5,500 gates and a 32-way
parallel encoder for OPC will require 11,000 gates. These area overheads do
not represent a large amount of chip real estate considering the billions of gates
available in recent processors and current trends indicate that logic cost and
speed will continue to scale down more rapidly than DRAM [47].
3These delay and area estimates are found through standard-cell synthesis using the
Synopsys toolchain and the 40nm TSMC standard cell library [135, 136], but are presented
in a technology-independent manner.
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Performance overhead: ECC decoding procedure consists of two phases:
error detection, which happens on every memory read, and error correction,
which happens with rare memory errors. Error detection is as simple as en-
coding and Bamboo ECC does not increase cycle latency compared to other
ECC mechanisms. An 8-bit RS symbol correction can be done within two
extra cycles (estimation based on [69, 24]) yet happens only in the rare cases
of a memory error and does not affect performance in the common case.
Bamboo ECC introduces some additional latency in the memory con-
troller due to the alignment of pin-based symbols. Until the completion of a
transfer, per-pin symbols are not fully available, which may delay encoding
and decoding. While encoding is on the less latency-critical write path (and
data are usually buffered before writes), decoding is on the latency-critical
read path. Bamboo ECC takes 4 DRAM cycles to transfer symbols (DDR
with burst length of 8), compared to 1 cycle in existing ECC schemes with
1- or 2-beat codewords. Section 3.4.3 evaluates the performance cost from
this increased latency, and shows that the impact is minor. This performance
impact can decrease further in future memories, as DRAM is aggressively re-
ducing cycle time to increase data bandwidth.
One way to overcome this additional latency is to use an asynchronous
ECC check [103]. With asynchronous ECC checking, data are speculatively
forwarded to the processing unit before decoding is complete. Later, if an error
is detected, the forwarded data and any dependent calculations are discarded
and corrected data are sent throughout the system. To be conservative, this
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dissertation does not apply an asynchronous ECC check—data are forwarded
only after they are determined to be error-free.
Because Bamboo ECC requires an entire cache line of data for encoding
and decoding, a partial-update of a cache line requires a read-modify-write to
read existing values, re-generate check bits, and write them back to memory.
Partial-update is a known issue for many existing ECC schemes [9]. Fortu-
nately, when using a write-back last-level cache, all write-hits are buffered in
the cache and flushed to main memory at the full cache-line granularity. As
a result, only uncached or uncacheable partial writes (which are often not
performance critical) will require read-modify-writes; this is not expected to
significantly alter system performance or efficiency.
3.4 Evaluation
This section measures the error correction and detection coverage, sys-
tem failure rate, and performance impact of Bamboo ECC schemes and com-
pares them with other state-of-the-art single-tiered ECC. The range and flex-
ibility of Bamboo ECC leads to a design space of error control schemes that
vary in their error coverage, redundancy, and expected system lifetime. This
design space is evaluated below, demonstrating the substantive strength, safety,






















Figure 3.6: The protection coverage and system reliability evaluation environ-
ment.
3.4.1 Error Coverage Evaluation
The error correction/detection coverage of each ECC scheme is evalu-
ated using Monte Carlo error injection experiments (Figure 3.6). Errors based
on 5 fault models (bit/pin/word/chip/rank faults) are generated and injected
into a cache line-sized memory block. These models represent faults at dif-
ferent levels of memory structures (e.g., cells, mats, chips and ranks) and
they match the fault modes in recent DRAM field studies [128, 129, 127]. A
bit-fault indicates that the block has a single bit-error at a random position,
and a pin-fault represents a block that has a single corrupted DQ pin. Simi-
larly, a word/chip/rank fault corrupts all bits within a single-chip/single-beat,
a single-chip/all-beats, and all-chips/all-beats, respectively. A fault scenario
can be one of the 5 fault models or a combination of them.
With given fault scenario, errors are randomly generated and injected
into a block, assuming that each bit within a corrupted region has a 50%
switching probability (but the error-free pattern is excluded). Error patterns
are tested by each ECC scheme to determine whether the error is detectable,
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correctable, or miscorrected. An undetected error and a miscorrected error
are categorized as SDC, while a detectable-but-uncorrectable error is reported
as a DUE. If any word within a block reports a DUE, the block is reported
as DUE. Similarly, if any word in a non-DUE block reports an SDC, the
block is classified as SDC. Finally, if all the words are corrected to their
original data, then the block is marked as a detectable and correctable error
(DCE). The number of experimental runs is 10 billion with 99.9% confidence
intervals of ±0.0000001% for probabilities near 0.0000001% or 99.9999999%,
and ±0.0003% for probabilities near 1% or 99%.
Table 3.2 shows error coverage of bit-level protection schemes (SEC-DED,
SPC, and SPC-TPD) on a 64-bit data channel. SEC-DED, SPC, and SPC-TPD
can all correct a bit or a pin fault. The single pin correction capability of SPC
and SPC-TPD shows worse correction than SEC-DED in some fault scenar-
ios as it cannot correct multiple 1-bit-error-per-beat errors with different DQ
positions over multiple beats (a situation that is expected to be rare). How-
ever, SPC and SPC-TPD require only one quarter and one half the redundant
storage of SEC-DED, respectively. The detection capability of SPC-TPD is
very strong, detecting ≥99.9996% of all errors in all scenarios, compared to
the weak error detection capabilities of SEC-DED (up to 23.5% SDC).
Table 3.3 shows the error coverage of SDDC schemes: AMD chipkill
and QPC on a 64-bit data channel with ×4 devices and Single 8-bit Symbol
Correcting codes (S8SC) and OPC on a 128-bit data channel with ×8 devices.







Codeword (bits x beats) 72 x 1 66 x 8 68 x 8
Codewords per MTB 8 1 1
Redundancy % 12.5% 3.13% 6.25%
1 bit/pin (%) DCE 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
1 word fault (%)
DCE 26.6667 26.6683 26.6667
DUE 55.5553 47.9143 73.3333
SDC 17.7780 25.4172 0.0000
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0091 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 98.8502 74.3182 99.9996
SDC 1.1407 25.6817 0.0004
1 bit fault +
1 bit fault (%)
DCE 87.5000 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 12.5000 75.4343 100.0000
SDC 0.0000 24.5657 0.0000
1 bit fault +
1 pin fault (%)
DCE 49.8036 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 50.1964 74.9024 100.0000
SDC 0.0000 25.0976 0.0000
1 bit fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 99.3297 74.3199 99.9996
SDC 0.6685 25.6801 0.0004
1 pin fault +
1 pin fault (%)
DCE 9.3043 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 90.6957 74.9016 100.0000
SDC 0.0000 25.0984 0.0000
1 pin fault +
1 word fault (%)
DCE 13.2878 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 63.1743 74.4093 100.0000
SDC 23.5380 25.5907 0.0000
1 pin fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 99.7537 74.3173 99.9996
SDC 0.2462 25.6827 0.0004
1 chip fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 99.9553 74.3190 99.9996
SDC 0.0447 25.6810 0.0004
1 rank fault (%)
DCE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DUE 99.9956 74.3202 99.9996
SDC 0.0044 25.6798 0.0004
Table 3.2: A comparison of the protection coverage of bit-level ECCs.
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Chip data width ×4 ×8
Channel configuration 1 ECC DIMM 2 ECC DIMMs
ECC AMD chipkill Bamboo QPC S8SC Bamboo OPC
Codeword (bits x beats) 72 x 2 72 x 8 144 x 2 144 x 8
Codewords per MTB 4 1 4 1
Redundancy % 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
1 bit/pin/
word/chip (%)
DCE 100.0000000 100.0000000 100.0000000 100.0000000
1 bit fault +
1 bit fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 100.0000000 0.0000000 100.0000000
DUE 98.9252058 0.0000000 99.4626331 0.0000000
SDC 1.0747942 0.0000000 0.5373669 0.0000000
1 bit fault +
1 pin fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 100.0000000 0.0000000 100.0000000
DUE 99.9399162 0.0000000 99.9831498 0.0000000
SDC 0.0600838 0.0000000 0.0168502 0.0000000
1 bit fault +
1 word fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 26.6685560 0.0000000 3.1369578
DUE 98.6450420 73.3314440 99.2156554 96.8630422
SDC 1.3549580 0.0000000 0.7843446 0.0000000
1 bit fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000262 0.0000000 0.0000000
DUE 99.9999993 99.9999734 100.0000000 100.0000000
SDC 0.0000007 0.0000004 0.0000000 0.0000000
1 pin fault +
1 pin fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 100.0000000 0.0000000 100.0000000
DUE 99.9887495 0.0000000 99.9831536 0.0000000
SDC 0.0112505 0.0000000 0.0168464 0.0000000
1 pin fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000259 0.0000000 0.0000000
DUE 99.9999998 99.9999737 100.0000000 100.0000000
SDC 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.0000000 0.0000000
1 chip fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
DUE 99.9999995 99.9999996 100.0000000 100.0000000
SDC 0.0000005 0.0000004 0.0000000 0.0000000
1 rank fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
DUE 100.0000000 99.9999994 100.0000000 100.0000000
SDC 0.0000000 0.0000006 0.0000000 0.0000000
Table 3.3: A comparison of the protection coverage of SDDC ECCs with ×4
and ×8 DRAM devices.
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history mechanism used by AMD chipkill. Among the ×4 SDDC schemes,
QPC has a better correction capability than AMD chipkill because of its ability
to correct two independent pin errors (e.g., 1 bit fault + 1 bit fault). In
addition, QPC has a very strong detection capability of ≥ 99.9999994% in all
scenarios, compared to the strong-yet-incomplete detection capability of AMD
chipkill (up to 1.4% SDC in some scenarios). While the detection coverage of
QPC is not a perfect 100% (a few pathological error patterns can result in
SDC), it applies not only to two-chip faults but also to many-chip faults that
represent very severe errors.
Despite the doubled redundancy for ×8 SDDC, S8SC still suffers from
up to 0.5% SDC with single-beat faults, where history-based mechanism is not
effective. Instead, no SDC is observed with OPC during the 10 billion runs,
proving its vast superior detection capability.
3.4.2 System Reliability
The error coverage results from Section 3.4.1 show that Bamboo ECC
provides superior error correction and vastly improves error detection relative
to prior single-tiered SDDC solutions. The true mettle of an error control
system, however, is tested by how much it improves the failure rate of a large
system at scale.
A two-stage Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate the failure rates
over time of a large system with different ECC schemes (Figure 3.6). The first




































Figure 3.7: The failure probability of a DDR 64-bit data channel over time
with different bit-level protection mechanisms.
modes and rates [128]. This first-stage fault injection methodology is similar to
that of [118], yet uses more detailed fault modes broken down by the number
of failing DQs to better evaluate the behavior of the pin-based Bamboo ECC.
Once (possibly) overlapping faults are identified by the first stage, the second
stage of Monte Carlo simulation maps the fault modes into one of the fault
models described in Section 3.4.1 and generates error patterns based on the
fault scenario. The error pattern is passed to ECC decoding in order to judge
its outcome. This realistically models the practical error coverage of each ECC
codes, as described in Section 3.2.
Figure 3.7 shows the failure rate of a single 64b data channel (2 ranks,
18 ×4 chips per rank) over time using different bit-level ECC mechanisms.
SPC-TPD has a slightly (1.2%) lower DUE probability and a 12, 000× lower
SDC probability than SEC-DED, despite requiring only half as much redun-
dancy. The lower DUE rate of SPC-TPD is due to this lower redundancy, as
the correspondingly lower raw fault rate is able to compensate for the slightly
weaker correction capability of the code. Using only a quarter of the redun-











































Figure 3.8: The failure probability of a DDR 64-bit data channel over time
with different SDDC protection mechanisms.
even lower raw fault rate than SPC-TPD. However, the weaker error detection
capability of SPC results in a 15× higher SDC probability than SEC-DED.
The failure rate of a 64b data channel (2 ranks, 18 ×4 chips per rank)
using SDDC protection is shown in Figure 3.8. QPC has 12% lower overall
failure probability than AMD chipkill because it can correct two independent
single-DQ faults. In addition, the strong error detection coverage of QPC
results in a 20, 000× lower SDC probability. Graceful downgrade using QPC
can correct a sequence of one chip and one pin (QPC to SPC-TPD with chip
retirement) or a sequence of one chip and up to three pins (QPC to SPC-TPD
to SPC with chip/pin retirement). The stronger correction of downgrade-based
schemes lowers the overall failure probability of chip and pin-based retirement
to 0.02 and 0.005 that of AMD, respectively. The SDC probability increases
with downgrade schemes, however, as they continue operation with reduced-
strength codes; despite this, downgraded QPC still demonstrates an SDC rate
that is comparable to, or better than that of AMD.











































Figure 3.9: The failure probability of a DDR 128-bit data channel with differ-
ent DDDC protection mechanisms.
ranks, 36 ×4 chips per rank). In this configuration, AMD chipkill was modified
to provide Double Device Data Correction (DDDC) protection (i.e., {36,4}
codes with history-based miscorrection detection), and is used as a baseline
for OPC. OPC has a 2% lower failure probability than doubled AMD chipkill
due to its ability to correct independent single-DQ faults. No occurrence
of SDC is observed with OPC during the 200B runs, while doubled AMD
chipkill shows a 10−10 probability of SDC. Doubled AMD chipkill can correct
a sequence of up to 3 faults by gracefully degrading through chip retirement
to AMD chipkill. The superior flexibility of OPC can correct a sequence of
up to 3 chip faults and 1 pin fault by degrading down to SPC-TPD with chip
retirement or a sequence of up to 3 chip and 3 pin faults by degrading down
to SPC with pin retirement.
Full-system estimates and lifetime considerations: Figure 3.10 il-
lustrates the failure probabilities of SDDC protection mechanisms on a large
system with one million memory channels, which is an order of magnitude



































Figure 3.10: The failure probability of a large system with 1,000,000 channels
over time with different SDDC protection mechanisms.
system. Several findings are readily apparent. First, the massive number of
DRAM channels makes the memory system quickly reach a state where some
locations report uncorrectable errors and must be repaired or replaced. RBS-
based graceful degradation can be used to combat this rapid wearout of the
memory system; by employing chip retirement and pin retirement, QPC can
decrease the probability of a system repair in the first year down to 8.5%
and 1.7%, respectively; beyond that point, a higher-level repair mechanism is
required. Also, the safety of QPC relative to AMD chipkill is demonstrated
through greatly reduced SDC rates; this safe detection can be combined with
higher-level repair scheme to ensure reliable operation of the huge system over
a long period of time.
There is a natural tradeoff between lifetime extension and guaranteed
safety—an aggressive lifetime-extending scheme, such as Bamboo ECC with
per-pin retirement, will spend the majority of its time in a degraded mode by
design; as such, its safety may suffer compared to a code that conservatively
reports a DUE. Through per-chip and per-pin retirement, Bamboo ECCs




































Figure 3.11: The failure probability of a large system with 1,000,000 channels
over time with different DDDC protection mechanisms.
even the most aggressively degrading Bamboo ECC schemes maintain compa-
rable SDC rates to AMD chipkill, such that even a long-lifetime Bamboo ECC
organization will not compromise system safety relative to the current state-
of-the-art.
To compare the system-level reliability among SDDC and DDDC mech-
anisms, Figure 3.11 presents the failure probabilities of DDDC schemes on a
system with the same number of DIMMs but half the channels. Note that this
wider channel configuration significantly sacrifices performance and energy ef-
ficiency for improved reliability. The double device correction capabilities have
limited improvements on DUE probability while their bigger codewords pro-
vide very safe detection capability (i.e., no SDC reported). RBS mechanisms
based on Bamboo ECC provide significantly better DUE and SDC probabil-
ities than the one based on doubled AMD chipkill in this configuration as
well.
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3.4.3 Performance and Energy
The performance cost of Bamboo ECC is modeled by running the SPEC
CPU 2006 benchmark suite [130, 39] on the Gem5 simulator [1, 19] (version
2.0). A 2GHz single-core processor with a 32KB I-cache, 64KB D-cache,
and a 2MB L2 cache is used with 2GB of DRAM and an L2 cache stride
prefetcher. The latency overhead of the ECC schemes is modeled in the read
data queue and write request queue of the memory controller. Existing ECC
schemes are given a +1 (memory) cycle penalty for both reads and writes, while
Bamboo ECC schemes have a +4 cycle read and a +1 cycle write penalty. This
3 additional cycle increase models the waiting time for all beats of each symbol
to be transferred. There are 2 memory configurations: DDR4-2400 (1.2GHz
DDR) 64b data channel and DDR4-2400 128b data channel. For the 128b
channel, the cache line size is increased from 64B to 128B to match the DRAM
access granularity. The measurement period is 0.2 billion instructions using
detailed simulation after 0.5 billion instructions of functional simulation (to
warm up the caches). Among the 29 SPEC CPU2006 benchmark applications,
26 are evaluated; perlbench, tonto, and dealII fail to run due to simulator
issues.
Figure 3.12 shows the execution time comparison between existing ECC
schemes and Bamboo ECC. The benchmarks are sorted based on their mem-
ory traffic. Bamboo ECC shows 0.7% and 0.5% execution cycle increases
compared to AMD chipkill on DDR4-2400 64b and DDR4-2400 128b, respec-
































































































































Figure 3.12: The execution time slowdown of Bamboo ECC schemes (normal-
ized to AMD chipkill).
and 1.7%, respectively. However, with the trend of increasing DDR bandwidth
and clock frequencies, the waiting time for the symbol transfer and its perfor-
mance impact should decrease. The execution cycle increases in Bamboo ECC
will be much smaller than the performance degradation from increasing the
data width from 64b to 128b for stronger ECC protection, which is reported
to be very performance limiting by Fujitsu [32].
DRAM energy consumption is estimated based on the Micron model [95]
with DDR4-2400 parameters [96]. The average differences between the exist-
ing ECC and Bamboo ECC schemes are 0.5% and 0.4% on 64b and 128b
channels, respectively. This increased energy consumption is mostly due to




ECC has long been used to detect and correct DRAM errors. A brief
review of prior single-tiered error protection approaches is presented below.
An emphasis is made on deciphering the state-of-the-art memory protection
schemes used by industry.
SEC-DED: A simple but widely-used ECC scheme for DRAM applies a
Single Error Correcting-Double Error Detecting (SEC-DED) code to each beat
of a memory transfer (Figure 3.13). On a 64b data channel, 8b of redundancy
are needed for SEC-DED, leading to the industry-standard 72b ECC DIMM
with 12.5% redundancy.
Interleaved SEC-DED Codes: One straightforward way to provide SDDC-
level memory protection is to interleave four SEC-DED codewords together.
By distributing data from a ×4 DRAM chip over 4 different codewords, single-
device-data-correction and double-device-data-detection can easily be achieved
(Figure 3.14). While such an approach was employed by IBM, HP, and EMC
in the past [29], it requires a 256b data channel. Forming such wide channels
are often disastrous to system performance and efficiency [32] and thus are not
competitive with Bamboo ECC.
Interleaved 2-bit Codes: Using the same methodology as interleaved





























































































Figure 3.16: The 4-bit Symbol SDDC (SSC-DSD) over (128+16)-bit channel
/ 1-beat.
ror Correcting – Double Adjacent Error Correcting (SEC-DAEC) ECCs (Fig-
ure 3.15). Some IBM and Compaq products seem to have used this ap-
proach [51, 7]. This scheme requires a 144b channel, and only provides SDDC—
poor detection capabilities are provided following this correction [90]. The wide
channel and poor handling of accumulating errors preclude this scheme from
being competitive with Bamboo ECC.
4-bit RS Codes: Sun and older AMD chips use a 4-bit symbol Single
Symbol Correcting-Double Symbol Detecting (SSC-DSD) RS codes to provide
SDDC on ×4 DRAM chips (Figure 3.16) [134, 8]. The symbols are aligned
to chip boundaries so that a chip-fault is confined to a single symbol and
can be corrected by SSC-DSD. Four symbols of redundancy are needed to
provide SDDC protection because of the narrow (4-bit) symbol size. This
scheme requires a 144b memory channel, and as such cannot compete with





















Figure 3.17: The 8-bit Symbol SDDC (SSC) over (64+8)-bit channel / 2-beat.
8-bit RS Codes: Newer AMD chips use a Single Symbol Correcting (SSC)
RS codes with an 8-bit symbol to provide SDDC on ×4 DRAM chips [9, 41].
The 8-bit symbols are built from two beats from the same ×4 chip so that a
chip fault is confined to a single symbol (Figure 3.17). The large, 8-bit symbol
size achieves SSC with 2 redundant symbols, allowing a 72b memory channel
to be serviced by a single DIMM. Operating on a narrow channel makes this
scheme efficient; as such it is the closest related work to Bamboo ECC.
Because this scheme does not provide Double Symbol Detecting (DSD)
protection with a 72b memory channel, 2-chip faults may lead to silent data
corruption. To mitigate these concerns, AMD uses the history of corrected
symbol locations within each cache line to heighten error detection (Sec-
tion 3.3.1.3).
Redundant Bit Steering and Double Device Data Correction Double
Device Data Correction (DDDC) is provided by some products for applications
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that demand higher levels of protection. Redundant bit steering (RBS)4 is a
technique that was developed by IBM for enterprise mainframe computers to
provide DDDC protection [21]. Remapping is done in the memory controller
and is transparent to both the OS and the user.
It seems as if DDDC capabilities are provided in current products
through RBS. Most notably, Intel’sDouble Device Data Correction (DDDC) [42]
(referred to by HP as Double ChipSpare [40]) appears to correct two sequential
chip-errors by applying a chip-level protection through dynamic bit steering.
If a chip fails, a spare chip is used to replace the failed chip. More recent prod-
ucts provide DDDC+1, which is able to correct an additional single bit-error
on top of DDDC [42].
While the exact details of RBS are unknown publicly at this time, a
sensible scheme that matches the reported redundancy requirements of com-
mercial products follows. An RS code with 4-bit symbols and a 128b data
channel requires a 3-symbol check code to provide SSC protection and an extra
symbol to provide SSC-DSD. At the beginning of system operation (assum-
ing no faults), memory uses all available pins to provide SSC-DSD protection.
Upon a detected chip or pin error, the memory controller downgrades all af-
fected memory to an SSC code and remaps the faulty chip through the fourth
redundant symbol.
By downgrading affected memory locations from an SSC-DSD code to
4Now referred to as IBM Memory ProteXion.
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an SSC code, a memory system can tolerate up to 2 successive chip failures
(DDDC-level protection). It seems likely that DDDC+1 downgrades protec-
tion to an SEC code following a second successive chip failure to provide
end-of-life bit-correction capabilities. Bamboo ECC is designed to be highly
amenable to RBS. Compared to other SDDC ECCs, Bamboo ECCs can pro-
vide a fine-grained retirement (such as a pin retirement) to face single-DQ
faults. In coordination with retirement, Bamboo ECC can provide superior
correction capabilities for sequential faults, correcting two concurrent chip-
faults and up to 3 sequential chip faults and 3 pin faults on the same 128b
channel as DDDC+1.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes a family of strong error checking
and correcting mechanisms for DRAM called Bamboo ECC. Bamboo ECC
provides superior efficiency, operating as single-tiered mechanism that offer
stronger-than-SDDC protection over a 64b data channel. Meanwhile, Bamboo
ECC is strong and safe, delivering increased correction capabilities relative to
the state-of-the-art single-tiered DRAM schemes while simultaneously decreas-
ing the silent data corruption rate. It shows that Bamboo ECC is amenable
to graceful downgrade using redundant bit steering and is able to offer an un-
precedented level of accumulating error protection. Bamboo ECC with RBS
also demonstrates superior flexibility, and is able to retire finer grained er-
rors and operate on narrower channels than the current state-of-the-art ECC
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mechanisms, potentially extending the memory system lifetime.
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Chapter 4
Mechanisms against Manufacturing Faults
This chapter presents and evaluates mechanisms that enable efficient
and reliable memory protection against imperfect process scaling. As process
technology scales past 10nm, it is getting more difficult to manufacture a fault-
free DRAM chip even when considering row and column sparing techniques.
Accordingly, DRAM vendors and academics have proposed in-DRAM ECC to
maintain high yield. In-DRAM ECC can correct bit-level errors from inherent
faults, improving manufacturability (Section 2.1). Meanwhile, high reliability
systems continue to require stronger-than-bit-level protection against severe
errors from operational faults. Current high-reliability systems employ SDDC
ECC across a rank using extra chips and can restore data even if one chip fails.
Separate management of in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC is wasteful and
requires up to 26.6% storage overheads, compared to the 12.5% redundancy
that is standard today.
Active Guardband ECC (AG-ECC) [80] utilizes a novel and unique
combination of ECC decoding and memory remapping that simultaneously
achieves high efficiency, high reliability, and high manufacturability. AG-ECC
uses a strong rank-level ECC to tolerate most inherent and operational faults
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by treating their errors as completely random. Because of redundancy and
granularity constraints, this common decoding for correcting random errors is
insufficient in rare cases where severe operational faults overlap inherent faults.
In such cases, AG-ECC uses the same rank-level ECC as a combination of era-
sure and random error decoding followed by remapping. This preserves the
efficiency of future accesses and maintains reliability against additional opera-
tional faults. As a result, AG-ECC can achieve stronger-than-in-DRAM-ECC
manufacturability and stronger-than-SDDC reliability with a total redundancy
of just 12.5% without introducing new capabilities or storage within DRAM
chips.
4.1 DRAM Faults from Process Scaling
Shrinking process technology makes DRAM more prone to inherent
faults for several reasons. A DRAM cell is composed of a transistor and
a capacitor. The smaller the transistor becomes, the more vulnerable it is
to minor defects. At the same time, smaller capacitors have more difficulty
in maintaining the required charge for correct operation due to aspect ratio
constraints [99, 70]. Narrower pitches can result in disturbance errors, such
as row hammering [82]. Increasing variability at smaller sizes can also cause
severe fluctuation in DRAM cell retention time. While the details of inherent
faults are unknown publicly at this time, prior research observes that they
manifest as random bit errors [99, 72, 16, 115].








Metric Failure In Time (FIT) Yield (%)
Cost center System loses dependability Vendor loses money
Correction Required Not required
Removal Not required Required
Table 4.1: Traditional approaches for high reliability and high manufactura-
bility.
manufacturability, and screening the faults out at manufacture time is difficult
because some of the faults generate errors occasionally (e.g., due to variable
retention time). Such faults that escape testing may generate errors during
operation, degrading system reliability. Despite this similarity, it is important
to clearly distinguish these two separate goals, quantify their requirements,
and optimize based on relevant metrics for each. Table 4.1 compares and
contrasts the traditional focus of reliability and manufacturability techniques.
While they both originate from faults in DRAM, their impact, cost center, and
recovery requirements differ. AG-ECC simultaneously targets both reliability
and manufacturability using a principled combination of ECC and fine-grained
retirement to maintain both high yield and a low FIT rate.
4.2 In-DRAM ECC
The DRAM process has been highly optimized so far to have few in-
herent faults. Inherent faults, if any, have been removed by coarse-grained
remapping schemes (e.g., spare rows and columns) to increase yield [137].
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With increasing prevalence of inherent faults and limited testing time, DRAM
vendors now provide post package repair [60, 67]. Post package repair allows a
memory controller to change a few memory row mappings during operation to
retire unscreened inherent faults and some operational faults. While current
industry practices tend towards coarse-grained remapping, academia proposed
fine-grained remapping at cache line granularity [99, 74], chip granularity [75],
and bit granularity [126]. These schemes support larger numbers of remap-
pings by reducing remapping overhead and can maintain high reliability in the
face of permanent operational faults.
Memory remapping alone is not sufficient, especially given the current
trend of increasing fine-grained inherent fault rates [45]; at a Cell Fault Rate
(CFR) of 10-5 (one out of every hundred-thousand cells is faulty), a 16GB ECC
DIMM has 1.5 million 64B blocks (0.5%) that need to be remapped. To im-
prove manufacturability without the need for expensive remapping schemes
and to tolerate latent inherent faults that escape testing, academics [155,
85] and DRAM suppliers [68, 81, 70, 107] are considering in-DRAM ECC.
In-DRAM ECC stores ECC check bits in redundant array storage within each
DRAM chip, generating this ECC internally before data is written and correct-
ing any single-bit errors inline before sending data back to the host processor.
In-DRAM ECC has been employed in low-power commodity DRAMs to im-
prove yield and decrease operating voltages [68, 14, 81, 67, 107], as well as





































(a) A ×8 chip. Each 72b
word is fetched and decoded by
SEC-DED ECC. All 64b data



































(b) A ×4 chip. Each 72b
word is fetched and decoded by
SEC-DED ECC. Only 32 of
the 64b data are transferred to
the processor.
Figure 4.1: In-DRAM ECC for DRAM chips with different data interface
widths but the same 12.5% redundancy.
In-DRAM ECC not only costs array storage and a modest amount
of encoding and decoding logic within DRAM, but it also degrades perfor-
mance [81, 70]. ECC decoding increases access latency and a mismatch be-
tween write data granularity and internal ECC codeword size requires read-
modify-write operations that can also degrade performance. The best or-
ganization of in-DRAM ECC is an open research topic. In one proposal,
in-DRAM ECC uses 8 bits of redundancy per 64 bits of data to provide inter-
nal SEC-DED protection [70]. On a ×8 chip (Figure 4.1a), the ECC data size
matches the transfer granularity of the chip and implementation is straightfor-
ward. However, on a ×4 chip (Figure 4.1b), whose access granularity is 32b,
the 64b ECC data size results in overfetching read data and read-modify-writes
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for write commands. Another in-DRAM ECC candidate increases the ECC
word size to 128 bits to amortize ECC overheads further [85, 70]. This de-
creases the amount of redundancy needed for SEC to 6.25%, but it exacerbates
the overfetching problem and decreases protection.
In-DRAM ECC is innately weaker than rank-level ECC because of its
per-chip operation—at this word size, in-DRAM ECC can only provide bit-
level correction (i.e., SEC-DED or SEC) without massive overfetching internal
to the DRAM. Also, in-DRAM ECC cannot correct errors outside the chip,
such as errors during transmission. In the context of a high-reliability system,
end-to-end protection is needed or such external DRAM errors may domi-
nate (Chapter 5). Meanwhile, current SDDC rank-level ECCs provide limited
improvement in manufacturability by failing to tolerate distributed bit-level
inherent faults across chips. Most importantly, providing high reliability in
the presence of both operational faults and a high rate of inherent faults is
challenging, so that future large-scale systems are expected to employ both
in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC at the expense of up to 26.6% redundancy
and overfetching.
4.3 ECC Guardband
High reliability in the presence of operational faults requires rank-level
ECC. In other words, the correction capability of rank-level ECC operates
as a guardband against operational faults. With increasing rates of inherent
















































































Figure 4.2: A strict ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC.
against inherent faults as well. This section presents three different uses of
this correction capability.
4.3.1 Strict ECC Guardband
In the proposed in-DRAM + rank-level ECC schemes [60, 67, 126],
all inherent faults are tolerated by in-DRAM ECC or remapping before the
system is operational and the entire correction capability of the rank-level ECC
serves as the ECC guardband against operational faults (Figure 4.2). Such
mechanism is called strict ECC guardband because it can strictly tolerate the
predetermined worst-case inherent (after remapping) and operational faults
simultaneously. Figure 4.2 (a) shows an example distribution of inherent cell
faults. Each bar represents the number of faulty cells within a particular
memory block that is read in one memory transfer (e.g., a 64B block); blocks
have up to 3 symbols with inherent faults in the example. After testing at
manufacture time, all inherent cell faults are either removed by remapping
or can be tolerated by the in-DRAM ECC and the rank-level ECC is used to


























































Figure 4.3: A zero ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC.
A strict ECC guardband provides high reliability at the expense of
requiring in-DRAM ECC and/or significant remapping resources; this is be-
cause the in-DRAM ECC is weak given the constraints on redundancy and
granularity within a DRAM chip. In fact, current in-DRAM ECC proposals
are limited to correcting a single erroneous bit. Section 4.5.1 shows that to
provide a strict ECC guardband under cell fault rates (CFRs) of 10-5 and 10-4,
more than 1,600 and 140,000 64B blocks, respectively, require remapping per
16GB ECC DIMM with in-DRAM ECC.
4.3.2 Zero ECC Guardband
The reason strict ECC guardband requires so much remapping capac-
ity is the weak in-DRAM ECC. As an alternative, zero ECC guardband uses
the rank-level ECC against both inherent and operational faults (Figure 4.3).
A strong rank-level ECC can tolerate a large number of bit errors, and zero
ECC guardband uses this strong correction capability to tolerate inherent
faults without considering possible operational faults. It is a very economi-
cal scheme as just the rank-level ECC covers both inherent and operational
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faults, yet degrades reliability because it can no longer tolerate severe opera-
tional faults (e.g., a dead chip) after the rank-level ECC uses up some of its
correction capability for inherent faults. Also, the manufacturability improve-
ment of zero ECC guardband can be limited because strong rank-level ECCs
are designed for faults that are expected to be confined to a single chip (i.e.,
SDDC), while inherent faults are distributed across all devices. In summary,
zero ECC guardband can improve manufacturability at the cost of high relia-
bility.
4.3.3 Active ECC Guardband
Active Guardband ECC (AG-ECC) efficiently utilizes rank-level ECC
with 12.5% redundancy to tolerate overlapping inherent and operational faults.
This satisfies both high reliability and high manufacturing yield requirements
economically using reasonable remapping requirements and a standard level of
redundancy. An AG-ECC follows the insight that in very rare cases, it is pos-
sible to allow high-overhead error correction as long as correction is cheap in
the common case and that overall reliability is not compromised. Thus, mem-
ory blocks with existing faults only need to be remapped if even the expensive
correction mechanism will not be able to tolerate the most severe error case
targeted by the protection scheme. In other words, the ECC guardband must
be maintained at a safe level, but that level is for exceptional cases rather than
for common accesses. To avoid repeated high-overhead correction and main-
tain the safe ECC guardband, recent advancement on fine-grained memory
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remapping (Section 4.6) is actively and dynamically applied.
There are three mechanisms that enable AG-ECC to restore data from
overlapping inherent and operational faults, whose errors can be beyond the
conventional correction capability of a rank-level ECC.
The first is to expand correction capability by using erasure-based cor-
rection. Erasure correction with known information of error locations doubles
the number of corrections compared to random error correction (Section 2.3).
For example, an ECC that can correct 4 random errors can replace 2 of its
error correction capability with 4 erasure corrections, resulting in a total of 6
corrections (2 random errors + 4 erasures).
The second is to identify the location of an operational fault using fault
diagnosis. With a DUE, AG-ECC starts a low overhead online diagnostic
routine which samples blocks along the same and nearby rows and columns to
the erring block to identify a block affected by the same operational fault but
no inherent fault. Correcting such a block provides the device location of the
operational fault, which can be used for erasure correction in the initial block.
This diagnosis is efficient because inherent faults are rare and operational faults
commonly affect multiple memory blocks. Even with a very high CFR of 10-5,
more than 99.5% of the blocks are expected to have no inherent fault. At
the same time, severe operational faults typically affect several memory blocks
(e.g., ≥90% of multi-pin faults affect a single DRAM row, single column, or a
group of rows in [128]). Note that if the diagnostic procedures are unable to
safely locate the operational fault, a DUE is reported. The same insight and
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a similar diagnosis procedure is also described by Nair et al. [100], though not
evaluated to the same depth.
Lastly, AG-ECC uses to remapping to control the severity of faults
and maintain the erasure-based SDDC guardband. The maximum number
of corrections is still limited even with erasure decoding. In the previous
example of 2-error and 4-erasure correcting codes, up to 6 symbol errors can
be corrected in total. As a result, blocks with more than 2 existing errors
will lose erasure-based correction capability if a future chip-level fault occurs.
To prevent this reliability failure, AG-ECC preemptively retires blocks with
more than 2 symbol errors after correction, so that all blocks are correctable
by erasure-based decoding against a future chip-level fault.
Blocks with less severe faults (i.e., 1 or 2 symbol errors) are not remapped
but continue to be used with cheap corrections; correction latency can be as
low as 1 or 2 cycles per correction (Section 4.4.4). This selective remapping
policy, which retires a faulty block only if it will be uncorrectable with a fu-
ture chip-level fault and tolerates other faults, can efficiently and effectively
reduce remapping overhead in the presence of frequent cell faults with minimal
impact on reliability.
We call this scheme active guardband because it actively manage mem-
ory error protection in a way that is analogous to how voltage/timing guard-
bands are managed to maintain reliable circuit operation while improving per-
formance and efficiency [86]. The following section presents a detailed example


































































































Figure 4.4: An active ECC guardband example with QPC Bamboo ECC.
4.4 Active Guardband QPC ECC
The goal of Active Guardband Quadruple Pin Correcting (AG-QPC)
ECC is to provide SDDC capability in the presence of inherent scaling cell
faults on standard 18-chip ECC DIMMs with ×4 DRAM devices. The multi-
symbol correction and by far safer detection capabilities of QPC make it an
excellent match for the AG-ECC approach. Following the AG-ECC flow dis-
cussed earlier, the threshold for remapping is set at two faults that affect
different symbols within a single memory block.
The overall flow of AG-QPC is depicted in Figure 4.4. AG-QPC main-
tains fault severity below a remapping threshold (i.e., 2 symbol errors) by
retiring blocks with more severe errors ((b) and (d)). Less severe faults are
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tolerated by the rank-level ECC. When a chip-level operational fault occurs
on top of existing faults, 5-6 symbol errors are corrected via erasure decoding
(c). More details about the decoding, fault diagnosis, and remapping schemes
in AG-QPC are presented in the following subsections.
4.4.1 ECC decoding
AG-QPC uses the same encoding and organization of Bamboo QPC as
that described in Chapter 3, but decoding is adapted for scaling faults. With
operational faults, it is very unlikely for more than two chips to simultaneously
manifest errors within the same memory block because operational faults are
independent [48]. Therefore, when such rare corrections are reported, they
can be pessimistically considered to result from a severe error miscorrection
and ignored (i.e., the corrections are discarded and the block is reported as a
DUE). This conservative correction reduces the likelihood that a severe error
goes undetected and results in an SDC. Hence, the original QPC decoder does
not attempt to correct some possibly-correctable errors and reports a DUE if
the symbol corrections belong to neither a single chip nor two separate DQs.
With inherent faults, however, the high cell fault rate results in many
memory blocks in which there are multi-chip faults, necessitating redesign of
the post-processing heuristic to better balance correction and detection; if
the same scheme were used, too many common correctable errors would be
reported as uncorrectable. Table 4.2 compares the correction and detection
capabilities of different post-processing schemes. QPC ECC decoding with n-
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Rank-level ECC QPC-2P QPC-3P QPC-4P
1 bit/pin/chip or
2×1 bit/pin faults (%) DCE 100.0000000 100.0000000 100.0000000
3× 1 bit/pin faults (%) DCE 0.0000000 100.0000000 100.0000000
DUE 100.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
4× 1 bit/pin faults (%) DCE 0.0000000 0.0000000 100.0000000
DUE 100.0000000 100.0000000 0.0000000
1 bit fault +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000262 0.0091167 1.5534977
DUE 99.9999734 99.9908829 98.4286531
SDC 0.0000004 0.0000004 0.0178492
2× 1 bit faults +
1 chip fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000162 0.0090661
DUE 99.9999996 99.9999791 99.9680300
SDC 0.0000004 0.0000047 0.0229039
Rank fault (%)
DCE 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
DUE 99.9999994 99.9999954 99.9763927
SDC 0.0000006 0.0000046 0.0236073
Table 4.2: A comparison of protection coverage using different QPC post-
processing schemes.
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pin correction (QPC-nP) accepts correction results if they belong to either a
single chip or n separate DQs. QPC-2P is the same as the original QPC ECC,
while QPC-4P has no post-processing. The result shows that QPC-3P has
balanced correction and detection capabilities by correcting a chip error or up
to 3 pin errors (e.g., 2 bit errors from inherent faults and 1 bit error from
operational fault) and detecting more than 99.999995% of any errors, which
makes it an excellent candidate to achieve both manufacturability (tolerating
inherent cell scaling faults) and reliability.
4.4.2 Fault Diagnosis and Erasure Decoding
Because of the initial test and remapping step, there are at most two
erroneous symbols from inherent cell faults in any block. Thus, errors from co-
located inherent faults and a chip-level operational fault may result in errors in
5-6 symbols and exceed the maximum error correction capability of QPC-3P,
which is limited to at most 4 symbols. In such cases, error decoding of QPC-3P
will report a DUE, except in extremely rare cases (< 5 × 10-6%, Table 4.2).
Before propagating an undetected error to the system, AG-ECC attempts fault
diagnosis. If the location of an error is precisely known from the diagnosis,
erasure decoding can correct it with only a single redundant symbol. Thus, if
the faulting DQs are known, the redundancy of 8 symbols is split as up to 4
symbols for erasure correction (one per DQ) and the other (≥ 4) symbols for
correcting the up to 2 random cell faults and for additional detection coverage.
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4.4.3 Remapping
AG-ECC relies on a remapping mechanism for fault avoidance. The
focus of this dissertation is not on the details of the remapping mechanism and
any of the schemes described in Section 4.6 may be used. However, to provide
a concrete example of a remapping mechanism, FreeFault [74] is considered.
FreeFault dynamically remaps blocks from DRAM into blocks in a processor’s
large last-level cache (LLC) and even when a substantial number of blocks is
remapped—up to several thousands of blocks—performance of the evaluated
benchmarks is not significantly impacted. Section 4.5.1 evaluates the degree
of remapping required and shows that remapping needs are reasonable and do
not overly stress the remapping mechanism.
Another important aspect of utilizing remapping for active guardband
management is that blocks exhibiting a severe combination of inherent and
operational faults, and which therefore require higher-overhead erasure cor-
rection, are remapped after the first erasure procedure. Recall that blocks
with up to two symbol errors do not need to be remapped because the ECC
guardband is maintained. Once block-remapping capacity is saturated, it is
also possible to map out an entire faulty device using one of Bamboo ECC’s




There are three sources of overhead for AG-QPC: the 12.5% redundant
DRAM chips, the ECC circuits, and additional memory access latency. The
redundancy level is standard and the circuits are not a significant concern as
evaluated in Section 3.3.3. Latency overhead is discussed below.
The Bamboo ECC codes of AG-QPC requires the entire memory block
to be transferred before decoding begins, which takes 4 DRAM bus cycles with
burst length of 8. Once the memory block has been transferred, QPC ECC
decoding proceeds: 2 cycles for syndrome generation and detection, an addi-
tional ≤ 2 cycles in rare cases of one symbol correction (∼ 0.5% of accesses
with a CFR of 10-5), and another ≤ 2 cycles in the even rarer cases that 2
symbols require correction (based on [69, 24]). The erasure decoding proce-
dure is estimated to take 12 cycles once the error locations are known. The
diagnostics procedure requires reading a small number of blocks that manifest
the same operational fault. While it may take hundreds of cycles, diagnosis
occurs once per operational fault and erasure decoding is only performed once
as well (followed by remapping); thus their overheads are negligible given that
operational faults occur once per hundreds of years (or more) on average per
DIMM.
In comparison, schemes that rely on in-DRAM ECC combined with
rank-level ECC have high latency overheads as well, in addition to power
overheads. First, in-DRAM ECC must internally decode the ECC requiring
2 cycles, followed by 1 cycle to transfer the information, and 2 cycles for the
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rank-level ECC. Thus, the read latency overhead of AG-QPC relative to these
schemes is just a single cycle.
As explained in Section 4.2, every write operation on a ×4 DRAM
with in-DRAM ECC requires a read-modify-write operation due to the smaller
on-chip transfer granularity (32b) than the in-DRAM ECC data size (64b).
While a write command is performing a read-modify-write operation, follow-
ing read/write commands on the same bank cannot access the internal data
bus and must be delayed. This increases DRAM write-to-write command de-
lay (tCCD L for write operations) and degrades performance. In-DRAM ECC
also increases DRAM power consumption with extra cells, overfetching reads,
and read-modify-write operations. This can significantly increase the DRAM
energy consumption of applications with a fair amount of write traffic. Sec-
tion 4.5.3 shows that AG-ECC with only rank-level ECC shows similar per-
formance but significantly better energy efficiency than the combination of
in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC.
4.5 Evaluation
This section measures the manufacturability, reliability, and perfor-
mance impacts of AG-QPC and compares them with the state-of-the-art ECC
schemes: DRAM with in-DRAM ECC + strict-ECC-guardband SDDC and
XED-DDDC. XED [100] combines in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC to pro-
vide high reliability against inherent and operational faults, including chip fail-
ures (Section 4.6). It uses in-DRAM ECC to detect errors and rank-level ECC
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to correct the detected errors using erasure decoding in most cases. AG-QPC
with 12.5% redundancy is directly compared to DDDC-level XED with 26.6%
total storage overhead from in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC redundancy.
The results demonstrate that AG-QPC provides stronger manufacturability
than in-DRAM ECC and roughly matches the high reliability currently seen
in high-performance systems despite the introduction of high inherent fault
rates. Furthermore, it does so without any changes to current DRAM chips,
modules, or interfaces while requiring reasonable fault remapping and retire-
ment capabilities. AG-QPC also shows similar performance yet better energy
efficiency than the in-DRAM + rank-level ECC based solutions.
4.5.1 Manufacturability
The manufacturability impact is evaluated by estimating DIMM yields
and uncorrectable block counts with varying bit-level inherent fault rates (i.e.,
CFR). XED-DDDC can correct up to two device errors per memory block,
yet using this full correction capability against inherent faults would sacrifice
reliability against chip-level operational faults. Therefore, it is assumed that
XED-DDDC tolerates 1-chip inherent faults (in addition to some bit faults
correctable by in-DRAM ECC) but retires any block that exhibits faults in
2 chips. This selection provides a balanced design of high manufacturability
and high reliability. Note that the manufacturability aspect is not discussed













None SDDC In-DRAM AG-QPC XED-DDDC
Figure 4.5: A comparison of 16GB DIMM yields using different ECC schemes
and varying cell fault rates.
DIMM yield: Figure 4.5 shows 16GB DIMM functional yield of the dif-
ferent error control schemes with varying CFRs, assuming that up to 32 64B
blocks in a DIMM can be remapped at manufacture time (e.g., through spare
rows and columns). In-DRAM ECC and XED remap memory at 128B gran-
ularity due to internal overfetching, while the others use 64B granularity.
The manufacturability of an ECC scheme depends on its correction capabil-
ity against inherent faults. With no ECC or standard SDDC rank-level ECC,
DIMM yield quickly drops to 0% around 10-10 CFR, explaining why DRAM
vendors have sought manufacturability solutions involving in-DRAM ECC.
In-DRAM ECC corrects up to one inherent bit error per chip; it maintains
almost 100% yield until a CFR of 10-7, and it can achieve high yield with
some block sparing until a CFR of 10-6. Above a CFR of 10-6, however, the
rate of two-bit errors in the same chip becomes problematic and the yield of
in-DRAM ECC quickly drops to 0%.
The fact that DRAM vendors employ In-DRAM ECC for the manufac-




















None SDDC In-DRAM AG-QPC XED-DDDC
Figure 4.6: A comparison of the number of spare 64B blocks needed to achieve
99.99% yield on 16GB DIMMs.
rate is at most a CFR of 10-6. AG-QPC easily handles an inherent fault rate
10× higher than this, despite requiring no DRAM changes and only 12.5%
total redundancy. XED-DDDC extends this protection even further, at the
cost of the increased redundancy and complexity of In-DRAM ECC. It is not
clear that this increased manufacturability offers any substantive advantages
unless an extreme CFR of > 10−4 is expected.
Needed spare block count: As yield with a fixed retirement space often
saturates to either 0 or 100%, the number of spare blocks needed to replace un-
correctable blocks is also measured as a metric for the cost needed to ensure a
given yield (Figure 4.6). No ECC and SDDC rank-level ECC require 30 spare
blocks to achieve 99.99% yield at a CFR of 10-10, but the retirement needs rise
sharply to 13 million blocks at 10-4. These numbers will increase with process
and capacity scaling, such that neither technique is viably manufacturable.
Similarly, in-DRAM + rank-level ECC requires 38 spare blocks at a CFR of
10-6, but the number explodes to 140,000 at 10-4, requiring a total of 17MB
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remapping capacity (assuming 128B block retirement due to in-DRAM ECC
overfetching) to deal with inherent faults. Despite only requiring 12.5% re-
dundancy, AG-QPC can achieve 99.99% yield at 10-5 and 10-4 CFRs with just
21 and 8,000 spare blocks, respectively, or 1KB and 500KB, respectively, of
64B retirement space; these remapping overheads are easily within reach of
FreeFault, frame retirement, and other remapping schemes. XED-DDDC uses
its double chip correction capability to minimize remapping and as such it re-
quires just 62 block remappings at 10-4; its overall 26.6% redundancy demands
a large amount of extra storage for ECC, however.
4.5.2 System Reliability
The reliability of the different ECC schemes is estimated by the DUE
and SDC failure probabilities of a DRAM channel using the two-stage Monte
Carlo simulation described in Section 3.4. The first Monte Carlo simulation
stage randomly injects faults into a simulated DRAM channel based on the
observed fault modes and rates of 2GB DDR2 DIMMs [128]. In the evaluation,
however, the DRAM bank count is doubled and the row count is quadrupled to
accommodate a 16GB DIMM capacity. Once (possibly overlapping) faults are
identified by the first stage, the second stage randomly generates errors based
on the underlying fault models, assuming each bit within a corrupted region
has a 50% flipping probability (but the error-free pattern is excluded). Also,
random bit errors are injected into each block based on the given inherent
cell fault rate. A protection scheme decodes the error patterns to determine
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whether the errors are detectable, correctable, or miscorrected. Undetected
errors and miscorrected errors are categorized as SDC. A corrected error
may be retired, if its severity exceeds the retirement threshold set by an ECC
scheme, before resuming the simulation run. If the number of remapped blocks
exceeds the capacity of the ECC scheme, the DIMM is marked as bad and
replaced. Periodic memory scrubbing with an 8-hour interval is used to prevent
the accumulation of transient faults.
Remapping can be crucial for reliability because it reduces the accumu-
lation of permanent faults and avoids the need for frequent DIMM replacement.
It is assumed that 64 64B blocks can be remapped by coarse-grained remap-
ping schemes (e.g., 32 remappings per rank with spare rows and columns)
and that several thousand blocks can be remapped by fine-grained remapping
schemes (e.g., FreeFault). Furthermore, it is assumed that the same remapping
scheme and storage space is shared between uncorrectable inherent faults and
operational faults. At a CFR of 10-6, for example, 99.99% of 16GB DIMMs
with in-DRAM ECC and SDDC rank-level ECC require less than 38 remapped
blocks, leaving the rest of the remapping capacity for operational faults in the
field. For reliability analyses at higher CFRs, the remapping capacity can be
increased with the help from fine-grained remapping schemes.
A large-granularity operational fault commonly corrupts only a small
fraction of blocks within its affected region. Instead of pessimistically retiring
all of the blocks within the fault range, distributions on the number of affected
blocks per fault mode is extracted from the same paper as the fault rates [128]
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to determine the necessary amount of remapping. The number of experimental
runs is 10 billion per scenario (CFR and scheme).
To compare reliability with current state-of-the-practice schemes, AMD
chipkill against operational faults only is set as the baseline to represent the
level of reliability in current high-reliability systems. There are two variants
of AMD chipkill with different remapping policies: one with DUE retirement
(which replaces a DIMM when a DUE is reported) and another with permanent
fault (PF) retirement that replaces a DIMM after repeated corrections from a
permanent fault are observed. DUE retirement is more efficient and requires
1/180× fewer DIMM replacements than PF retirement, but is less reliable
because it generates DUEs and SDCs in the presence of accumulated faults
(no DUE nor SDC is reported during 10B runs of PF retirement).
Baseline (DUE retire) Baseline (PF retire) ID + SDDC (64 spares) XED-DDDC (64 spares)
















































Figure 4.7: The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent
and operational faults (CFR = 10-6).
To analyze the reliability of systems with both inherent and opera-
tional faults, 3 ECC schemes are evaluated: In-DRAM + AMD chipkill, XED-
DDDC, and AG-QPC. Other protection schemes that fail to provide a rea-
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Baseline (DUE retire) Baseline (PF retire) ID + SDDC (2K spares) XED-DDDC (2K spares)
















































Figure 4.8: The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent


















































Figure 4.9: The reliability of a 2-rank DRAM channel against both inherent
and operational faults (CFR = 10-4).
sonable DIMM yield at a CFR of 10-6 are excluded. Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9
show the failure probabilities of a 2-rank DRAM channel due to combined op-
erational and inherent faults with a CFR of 10-6, 10-5, and 10-4, respectively.
The number of spare blocks ranges from 64 to 16K, which represents coarse-
grained retirement (e.g., 32 spare rows per rank) and fine-grained retirement
(e.g., Freefault), respectively. At 10-5 CFR, In-DRAM + SDDC (2K/16K
spares) and AG-QPC (2K spares) are excluded because they show 0% func-
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tional yield.
Several trends are notable. In-DRAM ECC with SDDC (26.6% redun-
dancy) provides strong protection against both DUEs and SDCs, at the cost
of frequent DIMM replacement. XED-DDDC (26.6% redundancy) reduces
the DIMM replacement frequency by orders of magnitude, but suffers from
an increased risk of silent data corruption. AG-QPC (12.5% redundancy)
offers a compelling tradeoff between replacement probability and SDC rate,
despite requiring no DRAM changes and using only half the redundancy of
the other schemes. AG-QPC requires roughly 60% less frequent DIMM re-
placement than in-DRAM ECC with SDDC—only 1.0% − 1.8% of AG-QPC
DIMMs need to be replaced within 5 years, depending on the inherent fault
rate and remapping capacity. In addition, AG-QPC provides 4− 7× stronger
protection against SDCs than XED-DDDC. All of the considered techniques
make frugal use of the available retirement storage, and for the most part in-
creasing the maximum number of spares does not make a meaningful reliability
difference, except in the DIMM replacement probability. A larger remapping
capacity can lower the DIMM replacement frequency (by up to 42% in our
evaluation) by tolerating a larger fraction of operational faults.
4.5.3 Performance and Energy
In addition to maintaining high manufacturability and reliability, AG-QPC
offers significant energy benefits over in-DRAM + rank-level ECC based so-
lutions. This overall impact is quantified using the Gem5 simulator [1] with
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Core
3.4GHz OoO core × 4 (issue width=8, ROB=192 entries)
32KB L1D, 1MB L2, 8MB L3 (64B lines)w/ stride prefetcher
DRAM timing
(cycle)
×4 16GB DIMM (DDR4-2400)
CAS latency tCCD L(WR) tFAW
No in-DRAM 16 6 16
In-DRAM 18 24 26
RD data FIFO lat. WR data FIFO lat.




IDD0 IDD3N IDD4R IDD4W IDD5
No in-DRAM 43 38 110 103 250
In-DRAM 46.8 44.3 141.3 184.3 254.1
Table 4.3: The performance/energy simulation parameters of AG-ECC.
DRAMSim2 [119] running homogeneous multi-programmed SPEC CPU 2006
workload mixes with one program per core [130]. Table 4.3 shows the machine
configuration, latency penalties, and DRAM power consumption used in this
evaluation. These parameters are based on the Intel E7-4470 CPU (Haswell)
and Micron DDR4-2400 memory [96]. Due to a lack of publicly available infor-
mation, in-DRAM ECC power consumption is estimated based on differences
between ×4 and ×8 configurations of the same DRAM chip. For example,
×4 and ×8 configurations activate 4Kb and 8Kb row buffers, and consume
IDD0s of 43mA and 46mA, respectively.1 In-DRAM ECC requires a 9Kb row
buffer, and accordingly it is estimated to consume 46.8mA. The read over-
head of the internal in-DRAM ECC read-modify-write operation is modeled as
1IDD0, IDD3N, IDD4R/IDD4W, and IDD5 are the DRAM activation current, active
standby current, operating burst read/write current, and burst refresh current, respectively















































































Figure 4.10: A comparison of the IPC slowdown comparison between AG-QPC
and in-DRAM-ECC-based schemes.
a {IDD4R×8 - IDD4R×4}×94 increase in IDD4W. The total power is calculated
based on Micron DDR3 power model [95] and divided by the average IPC to
calculate energy efficiency.
Figure 4.10 shows a performance comparison between AG-QPC and
in-DRAM ECC based schemes. The figure presents the IPC slowdowns of
the mechanisms against a system without ECC (neither in-DRAM nor rank-
level). The increased tCCD LWR (write-to-write delay) from read-modify-
write operations and the increased CAS latency in in-DRAM ECC degrade
the performance of memory-intensive applications by up to 3%. By elim-
inating in-DRAM ECC, AG-QPC not only improves storage efficiency but
it also maintains similar performance to ECC-free operation in most appli-
cations. The memory-intensive benchmark bwaves shows anomalously poor
performance with AG-QPC during the chosen program interval due to some
memory scheduling conflict caused by the QPC decoding delay. This causes
one processor core to starve relative to the others, slowing the overall perfor-


















































































Figure 4.11: A comparison of the DRAM energy efficiency between AG-QPC
and in-DRAM-ECC-based schemes.
is roughly 2% and it is less than that of in-DRAM + rank-level ECC.
Figure 4.11 shows that AG-QPC significantly improves energy effi-
ciency relative to in-DRAM + rank-level ECC. For bandwidth intensive ap-
plications, in-DRAM + rank-level ECC consumes 18% more DRAM energy
on average (and up to 25%) than an ECC-free system. AG-QPC shows a
more modest 0.5% average degradation in energy efficiency, akin to the nor-
mal expectations for an ECC-protected system. The benchmark bwaves suffers
from 3.6% energy degradation using AG-QPC due to its aforementioned 3.6%
slowdown. Compared to in-DRAM + rank-level ECC solutions with similar
reliability, AG-QPC offers more than 16% energy savings (up to 24%) in mem-
ory intensive applications.
4.6 Related Work
Traditionally, inherent DRAM faults have been controlled by fault-
removal mechanisms (e.g., spare rows and columns), while operational faults
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have been tolerated via rank-level ECC. More recently, rank-level ECC has
been employed to tolerate inherent faults caused by variability in retention
time and to aggressively trim retention margins as well [72, 115, 71, 88]. These
efforts use error coding against inherent faults, similar to this work, but they
do not consider the operational reliability of their endeavors nor do they target
SDDC level of reliability.
It has long been known that remapping can have a synergistic effect
with ECC for tolerating persistent operational faults [131, 133]; a finding that
has led to DRAM vendors providing post package repair in recent memo-
ries [60, 67]. Platform developers (such as NVIDIA [138]) retire memory frames
and rely on non-volatile storage to maintain the mapping. Academia has pro-
posed fine-grained remapping to reduce remapping overhead: ArchShield [99]
and FreeFault [74] with the cache line granularity, RelaxFault [75] with sub-
cacheline granularity, and CiDRA [126] with bit granularity. AG-ECC is
remapping-mechanism agnostic and could work alongside any of these ap-
proaches.
CiDRA [126] has some relation to AG-ECC in that it considers the use
of a fine-grained fault remapping cache alongside in-DRAM ECC and rank-
level SEC-DED. While CiDRA does concern itself with maintaining SEC-
DED levels of operational protection in the presence of inherent faults, it uses
both in-DRAM ECC and rank-level ECC (26.6% redundancy) and does not
consider SDDC levels of reliability. Also, the inherent fault model used by
CiDRA is stuck-at permanent failures and it relies on mask error correction
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which does not apply to retention faults. ECC-Asprin [73] is similar to CiDRA
but it uses rank-level ECC (12.5% redundancy) instead of in-DRAM ECC.
Again, it differs from AG-ECC because it maintains only SEC-DED levels of
protection and it relies on mask error correction for its fault diagnoses.
Several non-DRAMmemory papers have observed that ECC and remap-
ping can be combined to improve yield in a cost-effective manner [148, 91].
These approaches are similar in concept to AG-ECC, but they are not evalu-
ated in the context of DRAM and only incorporate reliability to demonstrate
that the effectiveness of bit-level ECC is not significantly compromised using
a simple stuck-at random bit error model. HI-ECC [145] and FREE-p [154]
adopt a similar approach for caches and non-volatile memories, respectively.
AG-ECC differs in many ways, not the least of which is the target of inherent
scaling faults combined with operational faults in DRAM.
VS-ECC [11] allows more aggressive voltage scaling by protecting weaker
SRAM cells with stronger protection. E-ECC [24] combines error and erasure
correction to provide SDDC-level protection on ×8 chips using one redundant
chip. If a chip error corrupts multiple ECC words within an access, it uti-
lizes the correction information of one word to apply erasure decoding on the
remaining words. XED [100] is closely related work that combines error and
erasure correction to provide high reliability against inherent and operational
faults. XED uses in-DRAM ECC to detect errors and rank-level ECC to cor-
rect the detected errors using erasure decoding in most cases. In some cases,
multiple chips may report errors from in-DRAM ECC, exceeding the erasure
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correction capability. When that happens, XED first attempts to use the
single-error correction capability of its in-DRAM ECC to correct the errors.
If that does not succeed, low-overhead online diagnostics are used to provide
additional information on fault location and erasure decoding is attempted
once more. On standard ECC DIMM with ×4 chips, XED can correct up
to 2 chip errors using the 2 extra chips (and some 1-bit-per-chip errors us-
ing in-DRAM ECC). Despite this strength, its reliance on in-DRAM ECC
increases the redundancy to 26.6% and degrades performance with overfetch-
ing.
4.7 Summary
While manufacturability and reliability are top priorities for DRAM
vendors and large-scale system designers, respectively, separate in-DRAM ECC
and rank-level ECC mechanisms incur storage overheads as high as 26.6% and
they can degrade performance with overfetching. This chapter presents a
novel and systematic management of rank-level ECC, called AG-ECC, to tol-
erate both inherent and operational faults. Rigorous evaluation shows that
AG-QPC satisfies both the high reliability and high manufacturability re-
quirements without modifying the conventional DRAM chips, modules, or
interfaces. Accordingly, AG-ECC may enable the economical scaling of stan-
dard DRAM technology to meet future capacity demands without sacrificing





Any thorough system-level protection scheme must be holistic and pro-
vide end-to-end protection. Strong protection of any one component provides
limited benefit to the overall reliability, as any unprotected component will
quickly become the reliability bottleneck. While the strong SDDC mechanisms
described in the previous chapters can reduce uncorrectable data error rates
down to 1 FIT/chip [93], Clock, Control, Command, and Address (CCCA) sig-
nal transfers are poorly protected or left unprotected. Transmission errors on
these signals are already as frequent as uncorrectable data errors with current
DRAM [127]. Transmission errors are likely to become more frequent than
uncorrectable data errors as transfer rates increase and I/O voltage levels de-
crease. Once manifested, these errors can result in serious data errors over a
large memory region which are not detectable by data-only protection. There-
fore, future systems will suffer from degraded overall memory reliability unless
strong protection against this important emerging error type is provided.
Parts of this chapter appear in [79]. The author is the main contributor of the idea,
implementation, and evaluation.
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This chapter presents All-Inclusive ECC (AI-ECC), a holistic mem-
ory protection scheme that is able to safeguard both DRAM data and CCCA
signals against storage and transmission errors. AI-ECC augments existing
data-protection schemes to provide very safe detection of CCCA errors with-
out additional redundant storage or new signals and without degrading the
effective level of data protection. It is meant to be an unobtrusive addition
to future memory standards. AI-ECC as an extension to DDR4 memory is
described, and is demonstrated to provide complete CCCA and data error
protection; DDR4 is the most dominant main memory system design today
for high-capacity servers and HPC systems, and is therefore used as a concrete
example.
5.1 DRAM Transmission Errors
Increasing transfer rates and decreasing I/O voltage levels make DRAM
transfers more vulnerable to transmission errors (Section 1.3). Attributes of
transmission errors make them easier to correct than storage errors but more
critical to detect and diagnose. An erroneous transmission can typically be
corrected by retry, simplifying the correction of any detected transmission
error. However, transmission errors are difficult to reproduce because most
of them are intermittent, making identification of the error in the first place
important for repairs.
For data signals, SDDC ECC can provide strong correction and safe































Figure 5.2: A write address error example.
faulty data lines. Recent memories also introduced Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) to detect write data transmission errors prior to updating storage
data [60, 61, 66]. These schemes provide very robust protection against data
transmission errors, enabling aggressive speed-ups of data transfer.
CCCA signals are more difficult to protect due to the fine-grained na-
ture of the signals. Compared to data, which has a wide interface (e.g., 64-bit
channel) and lengthy bursts (e.g., burst length of 8), CCCA has a narrower
interface (e.g., 27 CCCA signals) and cycle-by-cycle transfers, which make
amortization of redundancy overhead difficult and strong error coding expen-
sive. As will be shown later, the current JEDEC response of adding one bit
parity to the command and address signals is insufficient for many CCCA
errors. Furthermore, even the most aggressive known mechanisms from indus-
trial patents for dealing with CCCA errors only provide partial protection.












Figure 5.3: A command error example (duplicate activations).
some escape existing protection and can compromise the final output (i.e.,
SDCs), while others cannot be corrected by retries and require expensive
checkpoint-and-restart [38] to restore the data. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 give some
examples of address transmission errors and their associated consequences.
Figure 5.1 shows a transmission error that changes the address of a read op-
eration. Despite reading the wrong location, the data-only ECC codeword
({data B, ECC B}) is valid and the error causes an SDC. An error in a write
address (Figure 5.2) poses an even more serious risk—not only is the wrong
location (address B) updated with incorrect data, but also the data in the
originally intended destination (address A) becomes stale and incorrect. Both
locations have their storage data corrupted (memory data corruption (MDC))
yet each location still holds a valid ECC codeword such that a following read
will escape data-only ECC and result in SDC.
Transmission errors in the clock, control, and command signals can be
catastrophic as well. Figure 5.3 shows a CCCA error that generates duplicate
activations (for row A and B) on the same bank. In that case, the memory
bit-lines are already activated with row A data and mistakenly opening a word-
line copies this data into row B, destroying it and causing significant MDC.
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Accordingly, a later read to row B will yield valid codewords yet incorrect
data, resulting in SDC.
Rates of CCCA errors heavily depend on I/O and board designs and are
proprietary information, yet are likely growing rapidly with increasing trans-
fer rates. A large-scale field analysis on DDR3 DIMM shows that the number
of reported command/address errors by an even-parity detection mechanism
is as high as 72% of all uncorrectable data errors encountered using SDDC
ECC [127]. With a conservative assumption that circuit techniques will en-
sure a fixed Bit Error Ratio (BER), DDR4 with doubled command bandwidth
will suffer from more raw CCCA errors than uncorrectable data errors. With
a more realistic assumption that increasing transfer rates will increase BER,
weak protection (e.g., DDR4 command/address parity bit) will not be enough
and undetected CCCA errors will outpace uncorrectable data errors. Sec-
tion 5.4 shows that CCCA BER should be improved to one millionth of the
current JEDEC DDR4 standard (10-16 BER for data signals) [60], to make
undetectable CCCA error rate by the parity bit comparable to uncorrectable
data error rates by SDDC ECCs.
AI-ECC detects and diagnoses transmission errors as they occur, pre-
venting a high BER from translating into silent data corruption or system
failures. This allows the continuing use of commodity DRAMs (which are not
necessarily optimized for high reliability) in business or safety-critical systems,
even in the presence of increasing transmission error rates. Additionally, the









































Figure 5.4: The CCCA signal interface for DDR4 memory.
and other design choices, such as increasing operating frequency.
5.2 Current DRAM Practices
This section introduces the latest DDR4, which will be used as the un-
derlying DRAM for AI-ECC and future standards, with focuses on its CCCA
signals and reliability features.
5.2.1 DDR4 CCCA Signals
DDR4 DRAM commands use 28 non-data pins to issue and control 4
types of signals: clock (CK), control (CTRL), command (CMD), and address
(ADD), as shown in Figure 5.4 [60]. Note that signal identifiers are overlined
to differentiate them from DRAM commands. Also note that there is both an
activate command, ACT, and an activate signal, ACT.
There are 3 signals in the CTRL group; CKE, CS, and ODT. CKE
(clock enable) saves energy by putting an idle rank into a power-save mode. CS
(chip select) selects a rank in multi-rank configurations. ODT (on die termina-
tion) controls dynamic on-die termination of DRAM to improve transmission
quality for write data.
95
The CMD and ADD signals time-multiplex physical pins, called CA
(command and address). For non-ACT commands, pin 21/20/19 is used to
indicate the RAS (row address strobe)/CAS (column address strobe)/WE
(write enable) signal, respectively. For ACT commands, which require the
most address signals (up to 18 bits), DDR4 uses 21-19 pins to indicate address
signals, while a separate ACT pin indicates the command. A separate PAR
(command/address parity) signal transfers an even parity of the CA signals
to protect against transmission errors, as will be explained in more details in
Section 5.2.2. BG, BA, BC, and AP stand for bank group, bank address,
burst-chop, and auto-precharge, respectively. Transmission errors over any of
these CCCA signals can have a disastrous impact that is not correctable by
conventional data-only ECC.
5.2.2 DDR4 Reliability Features
Large-scale systems typically employ Data ECC (DECC) to protect
memory data against storage and transmission errors (Figure 5.5a). On a
read, DECC fetches both data and its ECC check bits, detecting and correcting
inconsistencies due to errors. A data transmission error on a memory write,
however, remains latent as MDC until a following read to the locations with
erroneous data. Such MDC is problematic, as it is likely to cause severe data
loss that is not correctable through ECC.
Accordingly, DDR4 introduces a write CRC (WCRC) for the early
























(a) An overview of Data ECC (DECC).
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(c) The DDR4 CA Parity (CAP).
Figure 5.5: The reliability features available with DDR4.
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data corruption (Figure 5.5b). WCRC generates an 8-bit CRC checksum of the
write data to each chip and transmits this CRC over 2 additional beats that
trail the standard 8-beat data transfer. Each DDR4 DRAM chip checks the
consistency of this checksum with the received data before writing its memory
array. On detecting an error, memory uses a separate signal (ALERT) to let
the memory controller to know and re-transmit.
DDR4 introduces two other weak ad-hoc mechanisms for dealing with
CCCA errors: CA parity (CAP) and Gear down mode. CA parity (Fig-
ure 5.5c) uses a dedicated pin (PAR) to transfer the even parity of the CMD/ADD
signals. Upon receiving a command, each DRAM chip computes the parity
of its received CMD/ADD and checks it against the received PAR. CAP is
a weak level of CCCA protection, as it does not cover the CK and CTRL
groups and cannot detect an even number of bit-errors on the CMD/ADD
signals. Gear down mode halves the CCCA transfer rate to trade off latency
and command bandwidth for signal quality, keeping the data transmission rate
and the data bandwidth the same. While gear down mode reduces the CCCA
error rate, it is not a viable solution for memory-intensive workloads that do
not exhibit very high locality.
5.3 All-Inclusive ECC
AI-ECC provides strong and thorough protection by combining 4 com-
plementary techniques. Extended data ECC (eDECC) and extended write CRC
(eWCRC) protect memory against address errors by exploiting currently un-
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used faculties of the data ECC and write CRC. They are able to strongly
protect both the data and address simultaneously with no extra storage and
transfer overheads. An architectural mechanism called the Command State
and Timing Checker (CSTC) uses memory protocol information to detect il-
legal command sequences and protect against errors in the CK, CTRL, and
CMD signals. Finally, extended CA Parity (eCAP) strengthens this command
error protection, filling remaining coverage holes.
5.3.1 Extended Data ECC for Address Protection
Extended data ECC (eDECC) augments SDDC data ECC to protect
address information without extra storage/transfer overheads (Figure 5.6). A
×4 DRAM transfers 32 bits of data per access; eDECC leverages the strength
of SDDC ECC to detect and precisely diagnose up to 32 bits of address infor-
mation. The 32-bit address used by AI-ECC is an MTB address that includes
the rank, bank, row, and (partial) column address for the given 64B block
of physical memory. By using the MTB address, AI-ECC can protect up to
256GB per channel (compared to 4GB if it uses the full byte address); a ca-
pacity of 256GB per channel is larger than any published DRAM standard
and it should be sufficient for even the highest-capacity servers.
Commonly used error coding can protect longer codewords than those
that are called for by conventional memory access granularities (i.e., shortened
codes, Section 2.3). These underlying capabilities are used by eDECC to embed

























(a) An overview of eDECC. Both the write address and data are ECC protected. On a read,

































































(d) eDECC codeword layout for Bamboo QPC ECC.
Figure 5.6: A visualization of the extended Data ECC (eDECC) mechanisms.
100
use for embedding other types of metadata [34, 35]. Figure 5.6b shows eDECC
with AMD chipkill [9]. The AMD chipkill data ECC codeword has 16 data
symbols and 2 check symbols, though its 8-bit RS codes could potentially
protect 237 more symbols without either extra redundancy or compromising
correction capability. AI-ECC adds one extra write address symbol to the
eDECC encoding using this auxiliary protection. On a read, the returned data
and redundancy are decoded together with the read address (Figure 5.6a). If a
read address error fetches data and redundancy from a wrong address (address
B instead of address A in Figure 5.6c), the inconsistent tuple ({address A, data
B, redundancy B}) will be detected by eDECC. Further decoding of the word
will reconstruct the address symbol from data and redundancy (address B in
Figure 5.6c), diagnosing the faulty address pins by revealing the erroneous
address that DRAM received. Figure 5.6d shows another example of eDECC
organization using Bamboo QPC ECC. The original Bamboo codeword with
64 data symbols and 8 check symbols is extended to hold 4 extra address
symbols. This eDECC organization is also able to detect and diagnose any
32-bit address error without additional redundancy.
5.3.2 Extended Write CRC for Timely Write Address Protection
Extended write CRC (eWCRC) extends the write CRC of DDR4 to pro-
tect the write address as well as the data, in a similar manner to how eDECC
extends data ECC. To implement eWCRC, the DRAM controller generates
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Figure 5.8: An overview of the Command State and Timing Checker.
shown in Figure 5.7. DRAM receives the CRC along with a write command
and validates its data and address prior to changing the contents of memory.
The detection coverage of eWCRC is 100% for any error that affects 8 or fewer
contiguous address or data bits, and 99.6% for more severe errors. eWCRC
detects write address errors prior to memory data corruption, allowing cheap
common-case correction through write retry. In the rare case that an address
error escapes the eWCRC, an MDC occurs; erroneously overwritten data can
be diagnosed by eDECC, but the stale data that is left behind can result in
SDC if read.
5.3.3 State and Timing Checker for Command Protection
The first tier of AI-ECC command protection is to detect illegal com-
mands by tracking DRAM state transitions and command arrival times. AI-ECC
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adds a Command State and Timing Checker (CSTC) to the DRAM along-
side each bank for this purpose; this CSTC checks the validity of received
commands based on the memory protocol (Figure 5.8). At any given time,
DRAM has a predetermined bank context (e.g., ACT/REF on an idle bank
and RD/WR/PRE on an open bank) and a valid context-breaking command
(e.g., ACT on an open bank) can be easily detected by monitoring bank states.
In the previous example of duplicate activations (Figure 5.3), the second er-
roneous activation on the already open bank will be detected by CSTC before
corrupting stored data. Missing activations are not immediately detected by
the CSTC, but they change the bank state so that the next command to the
bank will trigger a CSTC error and data integrity is not compromised. Addi-
tionally, command arrival times are monitored to detect erroneous commands
that violate the DRAM timing guarantees. Each CSTC is implemented as a
small Finite State Machine (FSM) using DRAM commands from the JEDEC
standard and binned timing parameters that are known by the vendor. Ta-
ble 5.1 shows the bank state and timing constraints for DDR4 DRAM, taken
from the JEDEC specification [60]. Commands for DRAM initialization (mode
register set and ZQ calibration) and for power saving modes (self-refresh and
power down) are excluded for simplicity, but these commands are later in-
cluded in our experimental evaluation.
Command Error Detection by Address Protection: While the CSTC
can detect any state-altering command error (e.g., transition to or from ACT
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Command Bank state Timing parameters
ACT Idle tRC, tRRD, tFAW, tRP, tRFC
REF Idle tRRD, tFAW, tRP, tRFC
RD Open tRCD, tCCD, tWTR
WR Open tRCD, tCCD
PRE Open tRAS, tRTP, tWR
NOP Any None
Table 5.1: DDR4 DRAM commands with their allowed bank state and timing
constraints.
or PRE) and any timing violation, some errors are not necessarily caught by
the CSTC; most of these errors either will be detected through the address
checking mechanisms or do not compromise the functionality of the system.
Errors that corrupt a command to or from an RD result in an extra
or missing read operation, respectively. An extra or missing read command
corrupts the write pointer in the read data FIFO of the DDR PHY (physical
interface) such that the memory controller receives a wrong entry from the
PHY. This wrong entry is then detected by eDECC as it will not validate the
address of the codeword taken from the read FIFO (this address is produced
and stored within the memory controller itself and is not subject to transmis-
sion errors). An extra write command will attempt to interpret the I/O at
the data pins as a value and will write this value back to the open row. The
data interpreted from the undriven I/O pins can be random (if they are fully
undriven) or all-ones (if they are partially driven by termination resistors); in
either case, the erroneous write will be handled by the eWCRC and eDECC















Figure 5.9: An overview of the Extended CA Parity (eCAP).
An extra refresh operation with valid timing may not be detected by
the CSTC, but it does not affect correct operation. A missing refresh is not
detected; DRAM has some retention time margins so that a lost refresh oper-
ation does not corrupt data.
5.3.4 Extended CA Parity (eCAP)
The only command error that is not covered by either the CSTC or
the AI-ECC address checking mechanisms is a missing write. In this case,
as DRAM never receives the command, it would not report an error and the
memory controller would assume that an error-free write completes. To detect
this erroneous situation, the CA parity of DDR4 is extended to cover missing
WR commands (Figure 5.9). To enforce extended CA parity (eCAP), the
memory controller and memory maintain synchronized write toggle (WRT)
bits that flip upon sending/receiving a WR command. The CA parity is then
generated across both the 24 CA pin values and the WRT bit. If there is a
missing WR, the WRT values in the memory controller and memory disagree
on the next command and the error is detected.
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5.3.5 Clock and Control Protection
Errors in the CK and CTRL signals can compromise commands as well.
An additional toggle on CK results in the reception of an erroneous command,
while a missing toggle causes a command to be lost. Errors in CKE (clock
enable) and CS (chip select) can also incur an extra/missing command. These
extra/missing commands are all detected by CSTC, eDECC, eWCRC, and
eCAP as explained above. Errors in ODT (on die termination) degrade the
data signal quality, which can be detected by eWCRC and eDECC.
5.3.6 Precise Diagnosis
eDECC not only detects address errors but can also pin-point faulty
address pin(s) by restoring the original address and comparing it against the
erroneous address. Such knowledge can be valuable to repair techniques, such
as selectively tuning delay and drive parameters of the reported pin. With-
out this knowledge, extensive diagnostic routines are required to identify in-
termittent transmission errors or repeated CCCA errors may impact system
reliability and availability.
5.3.7 Correction Details
AI-ECC correction is more straightforward than data correction via
ECC. Because AI-ECC generally detects CCCA errors early (before possible
data corruption), correction simply entails retrying the faulty command. In

























Figure 5.10: The CCCA reliability evaluation environment.
then a DUE must be flagged to higher system levels. This is no difference from
current systems that encounter an uncorrectable error, and the uncorrectable
AI-ECC error rate is shown in Section 5.4 to be low.
5.4 Evaluation
This section measures the reliability and efficiency of AI-ECC and com-
pares them with current practices and state-of-the-art industrial patents. Sec-
tion 5.4.1 analyzes the level of CCCA reliability provided by AI-ECC and
prior protection techniques. Section 5.4.2 investigates the impact of AI-ECC
on the strength of the SDDC data protection, finding it to be negligible. Sec-
tion 5.4.3 estimates the system-level reliability of systems with transmission
errors, showing the impact of AI-ECC to be significant in many scenarios. Fi-
nally, Section 5.4.4 describes the modest design changes (and correspondingly
low overheads) required to extend a DDR4 memory to support AI-ECC.
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5.4.1 CCCA Reliability
The CCCA error detection coverage is evaluated using Monte-Carlo
error injection simulations, as depicted by Figure 5.10. Transmission errors are
modeled as 1-pin, 2-pin, and all-pin errors; these models represent transmission
noise such as inter-symbol interference, crosstalk with 2 victims, and power
noise, respectively. A CK error is modeled as one source of all-pin errors, rather
than individual 1-pin errors. Errors are injected into the 27 CTRL, CMD, and
ADD signals of the target command. In the no-protection configuration, errors
are not injected on the PAR pin because it is assumed to be non-existent
or disconnected. A multi-pin error has 50% switching probability for each
erroneous pin.
A CCCA error has different consequences with different DRAM com-
mands; 5 dominant command patterns are tested: ACT (followed by WR),
ACT (followed by RD), WR, RD, and PRE. ACT is sub-categorized because
the consequence of an activate error depends on the following command—a
missing ACT followed by a WR results in memory data corruption, while a
missing ACT followed by an RD reads arbitrary data but does not corrupt stor-
age. The impact of other command errors does not vary significantly based
on the following command, and a single test sequence is used for each. A
DRAM model is implemented to track DRAM state, decode erroneous CCCA
signals, and interpret the impact of each error based on the decoded command
and resultant DRAM state. Before each erroneous command, the simulated
DRAM is set to have all banks open (except for erroneous ACTs where the
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Erroneous Pin DRAM Command in Error
# Name ACT WR RD PRE
27 CK Clock error
26,25 CKE, CS ACT− WR− RD− PRE−
24 ODT On-die termination error
23 PAR No error
22 ACT ACT→? ACT+
21 RAS/A16 WR→MRS RD→REF PRE→ZQC






ACTbankaddr WRbankaddr RDbankaddr PREbankaddr
14 A12/BC WRburstchop RDburstchop No error




WRcoladdr RDcoladdr No error
SDC SDC and conditional MDC SDC and MDC
Table 5.2: The impact of 1-pin CCCA errors across pin locations and com-
mands.
target bank is closed).
5.4.1.1 Impact of undetected CCCA errors
Table 5.2 presents results from undetected 1-pin CCCA errors. CMD-
/CMD+/CMDA→CMDB indicate missing, extra, and altered commands (changed
from CMDA to CMDB), respectively. A transition to MRS, ZQC, and RFU
indicate that the DRAM was erroneously given a mode register set command,
ZQ calibration command, or a reserved-for-future-use command, respectively.
The key findings are summarized below (results of 2-pin and all-pin errors
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appear in later experiments, but they are not included in this analysis for sim-
plicity). ACT: Any undetected error during an ACT causes a failure. Errors
in the row address select an incorrect row, resulting in SDC+MDC (if fol-
lowed by WR) or SDC (if followed by RD). WR: Three pins (A11, A13, and
A17) do not participate in the WR operation and manifest no error. Errors
on CKE, CS, ODT, ACT, RAS, CAS, WE, BC, AP, bank address, and col-
umn address manifest as SDC+MDC. RD: Three pins (A11, A13, and A17)
manifest no error. Errors on CKE, CS, CAS, BC, bank address, and column
address manifest as SDC in the read data, while errors on other signals gener-
ate SDC+MDC. PRE: Fourteen pins (A17, A13∼A11, A9∼A0) manifest no
error, while errors on CKE, CS, ACT, RAS, CAS, WE, A10 and bank address
manifest SDC+MDC.
5.4.1.2 Detection Coverage
The generated CCCA errors are checked against four increasing lev-
els of protection: no protection, DDR4 + data ECC, DDR4 + eDECC, and
DDR4 + AI-ECC. DDR4 + eDECC is used to represent the strongest address
protection available through some patents [104, 102].
Figure 5.11 shows the fraction of 1-/2-/all-pin CCCA errors that DECC,
eDECC, and AI-ECC can detect. Some MDCs can be detected prior to data
corruption (i.e., early detection), while others are detected after the corrup-
tion (i.e., late detection). 1-pin errors: CA parity detects 1-pin errors on the
24 CA signals but not on the 3 CTRL signals, two of which are problematic
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Figure 5.11: The CCCA error detection coverage of an unprotected DDR4
DIMM (None), DDR4+DECC (DECC), DDR4+eDECC (eDECC), and
DDR4+AIECC (AIECC).
(CKE and CS). A missing RD command manifests as SDC with data-only
DECC, yet it can be detected by eDECC. AI-ECC can detect all 1-pin errors.
2-pin errors: The detection strength of CA parity is limited for 2-pin errors, re-
sulting in large coverage holes in DDR4+DECC and DDR4+eDECC. AI-ECC
fills the holes in CAP, avoiding nearly all SDC and MDC; only those errors that
escape eWCRC (0.4% of such errors) cause an SDC when the target location
that has stale data is read and cause an MDC at the erroneous location, which
can then be detected by eDECC. All-pin errors: CA parity actually performs



























eCAP only eWCRC only eDECC only CSTC only
Address Protection Command Protection eCAP + eWCRC + eDECC AIECC
Figure 5.12: A quantitative evaluation of the different AI-ECC components:
eDECC, eWCRC, address protection (eDECC+eWCRC), CSTC, eCAP, com-
mand protection (CSTC+eCAP), eDECC+eWCRC +eCAP (for complete-
ness), and AI-ECC.
of detecting the error. However, as undetected command and control errors
are likely to severely corrupt data, extra coverage is still needed. AI-ECC
provides thorough command and control protection using CSTC and eCAP,
and only errors that escape eWCRC may cause SDC+MDC.
Figure 5.12 shows which AI-ECC components detect different CCCA
errors. It is apparent that the most effective CCCA protection mechanism
heavily depends on the specific error scenario, such that all four AI-ECC
mechanisms are required for robust CCCA error coverage. Address protec-
tion (eWCRC and eDECC) is crucial for protecting write and read commands.
All-pin errors during activation are best detected by CSTC, as the errors fre-
quently change the command into another (invalid) command. However, eCAP
is the most effective mechanism for 1-pin activation errors, and 2-pin errors
are protected by either address protection or CSTC, depending on whether









1-bit 100% DCE 100% DCE
1-chip 100% DCE 100% DCE
rank 6× 10-7% SDC 6× 10-7% SDC
1-bit
None 100% SDC 100% DCE
1-bit 100% SDC 100% DCE
1-chip 100% SDC 4× 10-7% SDC
rank 100% SDC 6× 10-7% SDC
32-bit
None 100% SDC 100% DCE
1-bit 100% SDC 4× 10-7% SDC
1-chip 100% SDC 6× 10-7% SDC
rank 100% SDC 6× 10-7% SDC
Table 5.3: A comparison of the data and address protection coverage of Bam-
boo QPC with and without address protection.
eWCRC, CSTC, and eCAP is AI-ECC able to provide complete coverage.
5.4.2 Data Reliability
Despite its strong level of CCCA protection, AI-ECC has a negligible
impact on the levels of existing data protection. To evaluate potential ECC
coverage loss from protecting both data and address, Bamboo QPC is evalu-
ated with and without eDECC against data and address errors using random
error injection simulations (Section 3.4.1). Table 5.3 compares the level of
data and address protection. With no address error, eDECC does not change
the correction capability and does not show observable differences in the very
strong detection capability against data errors. With concurrent address and
data errors, eDECC can correct most of them with decoding (if the number
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of erroneous symbols is no greater than 4) or with a retry (otherwise) while
data-only protection results in SDCs.
5.4.3 System Reliability
Section 5.4.1 shows that AI-ECC provides thorough and strong protec-
tion against CCCA errors on any and all pins. Its implication on system-level
reliability, however, depends on the underlying CCCA error rate. Due to a
lack of publicly available DDR4 CCCA error rates, a sensitivity sweep on
the BER is performed and multiplied with command bandwidths and signal
counts to estimate CCCA error rates. Other approaches for CCCA errors,
such as simulation-based modeling and lab measurements, are excluded due
to factors like confidential process and layout information and low confidence
from limited samples.
Due to the dependence of CCCA error manifestation on the DRAM
command stream, the DRAM behavior of 56 benchmarks from the NPB, SPEC
CPU 2006, PARSEC, and SPLASH2X benchmark suites1 [2, 130, 17, 147] is
characterized using the Xeon E5 and E7 v3 memory controller performance
counters [5]. Four representative clusters are identified by hierarchically clus-
tering across the memory bandwidth utilization, read to write ratio, CAS to
ACT ratio, and ACT→RD to ACT→WR ratio of each program. Three of
the clusters differ mainly in their data bandwidth utilization, and the other
1The C, ref, and native input sets are used for these suites, with one thread per core.
SPEC CPU 2006 is run with 10 replicated processes in order to fit in a 16GB memory
footprint.
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# Apps Major Feature Data BW
Command BW (×106 cmds/sec)
ACT (+WR) ACT (+RD) WR RD PRE
33 Low Data BW 0.50% 0.64 0.39 0.69 2.22 1.03
10 Med. Data BW 7.90% 9.18 16.7 8.57 33.3 25.9
11 High Data BW 22.0% 39.4 76.2 29.2 90.1 116
wat-ns High RD/WR 4.31% 0.15 6.13 0.17 23.6 6.28
Table 5.4: Representative benchmark clusters and their bandwidths.
(SPLASH2X’s wat-ns) is an outlier with an extreme read-to-write ratio.2 Ta-
ble 5.4 gives the data and command bandwidth for the median centroids of
these clusters.
For a given BER, the CCCA FIT rate of each representative centroid is
estimated using Equation 5.1. This equation accumulates the FIT contribution
from each CCCA-sensitive command—ACT (+WR), ACT (+RD), WR, RD,
and PRE—over all 1-pin errors. Apart from a CK error, which affects all
pins, no multi-pin errors are modeled due to a lack of data on their rates and









× 3.6× 1012} (5.1)















































































Figure 5.13: An estimation on ×4 DRAM CCCA FIT rates after protection
with 10-22 BER.
CMD = {ACT(+WR), ACT(+RD), WR, RD, PRE}
ERR = {1-pin error, all-pin error}
The evaluation sweeps from 10-16 BER, which is the minimum design
specification for data in the JEDEC DDR4 standard [60], up to 10-22. The
minimum JEDEC BER of 10-16 is very weak and corresponds to 2.8×106 un-
protected FITCCCA per device with the high-bandwidth centroid. This BER
is likely to be higher than that in a real system—the FIT of a DDR2/DDR3
x4 DRAM device (including both storage and transmission errors) is around
25–66 [128, 129, 127]. The stronger BER of 10-22 corresponds to 2.8 FITCCCA,
3.4× 106 system-FIT and a 12-day MTTF on a system with 1.2M DRAM de-
vices. This number could be within an order of magnitude of the CCCA error
rate exhibited by the Cielo system [127], which has a similar number of DDR3
chips as the modeled system; however, the actual measurements on Cielo are
not public at the time of writing this dissertation.
Figure 5.13 shows FITCCCA from 10




None DECC eDECC AI-ECC
1.2M DRAM
devices
10-22 12 days 4 months 5 months 768 years
10-21 1 day 13 days 15 days 77 years
10-20 3 hours 32 hours 35 hours 8 years
36M DRAM
devices
10-22 10 hours 4 days 5 days 26 years
10-21 1 hour 10 hours 12 hours 3 years
10-20 6 minutes 1 hour 1 hour 3 months
Table 5.5: An evaluation of mean time to CCCA SDC failure on systems with
1.2M and 36M DRAM devices and high bandwidth utilization.
tion. Applications with more data bandwidth have a higher FITCCCA because
they issue more commands. DDR4+DECC reduces the CCCA SDC and MDC
rates by an order of magnitude using the DDR4 reliability mechanisms (e.g.,
CAP). eDECC reduces the SDC rate further by detecting read address errors.
AI-ECC improves the unprotected CCCA failure rate by four orders of mag-
nitude because it detects all read errors and nearly all write errors (as was
shown in Section 5.4.1.2). Large-scale systems utilizing DDR4 can suffer from
increased CCCA error rates due to its doubled transfer rate, and higher BER
values of 10-21 and 10-20 are tested as well. These BERs change the Y-axis
scale of Figure 5.13 yet the shape remains the same.
Table 5.5 shows the estimated CCCA mean-time-to-failure (MTTF)
of a current-scale large system (1.2M DRAM chips in the Cielo supercom-
puter [127]) and a future-scale large system (36M DRAM chips or 1M 2-rank
DRAM channels for the Exascale computing) with high bandwidth utilization.
In the current-scale system, AI-ECC provides an MTTF of 8 years, even with
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the more severe BER. In contrast, other schemes have orders of magnitude
worse reliability with an MTTF of just 1 or 2 days. Even in the future-scale
system, AI-ECC can still provide high reliability against CCCA errors.
5.4.4 Hardware Overheads
AI-ECC has negligible hardware overhead and it represents a straight-
forward upgrade to existing DDR4 features and SDDC data ECC. It requires
no additional pins or bandwidth to and from memory as it reuses the existing
WCRC and CAP mechanisms and it does not require any additional ECC
storage. A Verilog model of AI-ECC is implemented and synthesized with the
Synopsys toolchain and the TSMC 40nm LP standard cell library [135, 136] to
estimate its logic overheads. eCAP/eWCRC/eDECC+AMD/eDECC+QPC
have area overheads equivalent to 30/180/140/2200 NAND2 gates and dy-
namic+static power increases of 0.01/0.1/0.05/0.8mW, respectively. The logic
depth of the DECC decoder increases by 1 XOR gate and cycle latency is not
impacted. On the DRAM side, eCAP/eWCRC/CSTC require the area equiv-
alent of 30/180/9000 NAND2 gates per chip and consume 0.01/0.1/0.8mW,
respectively. CSTC is off the critical path and it does not affect memory
latency. The AI-ECC correction procedure requires support in the memory
controller for command replay. Most systems, however, already support on-
demand scrubbing3 [9, 30] (writing back corrected data to DRAM to eliminate
transient bit-flips), and the further additions for AI-ECC correction are ex-
3On-demand scrubbing is also called redirect scrubbing by AMD
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pected to be modest.
While eDECC does not impact performance with QPC ECC, it could
potentially increase read latency if AMD chipkill or other SDDC schemes are
used. These schemes can detect data errors before a read transfer is complete,
but would have to wait until the end of a block transfer for precise eDECC
address error diagnosis. Prior simulation results of Bamboo ECC show this
performance overhead to be modest (an average of 0.7% on a 64-bit DDR4-2400
data channel (Section 3.4.3)). Alternatively, a different eDECC organization
could sacrifice precise diagnosis to enable early data error detection, or asyn-
chronous ECC checking [103] could avoid this penalty in the common case; a
detailed exploration of AI-ECC performance with alternative ECC schemes is
left for future work.
5.5 Related Work
The topic of the end-to-end memory protection is of great importance
to the server industry, and some form of CCCA protection has been the topic
of patents from Freescale [98], Fujitsu [84], IBM [22, 23, 102], Intel [143], Mi-
cron [110, 140], Sun (now Oracle) [114, 146], Azul Systems [104, 105], and oth-
ers [31, 144]. The different approaches taken by these protection mechanisms
(as well as a single chain of academic literature [34, 35, 121]) are described
below.
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Separate Address Protection: Various authors describe techniques to
protect the address signal using separate check bits [110, 140, 114]. While these
approaches are straightforward, they are inefficient as they sacrifice transmis-
sion bandwidth and require additional signals to and from memory.
Combined Address and Data Protection: Address protection can be
combined with data protection while sharing check bits. It appears that two
prevailing techniques exist for such protection: codeword transformation and
combined ECC.
Codeword transformation uses the address information to transform
the data or check bits upon a write, reversing this transformation before ECC
decoding. In the case of an address transmission error, this reverse transfor-
mation will corrupt the codeword; this corruption may be detected via data
ECC. Nicholas [102] partitions a write data block into 32 sub-blocks and
XORs each sub-block with a corresponding address bit. Sub-blocks should be
organized to report address errors as detectable-yet-uncorrectable; no specific
ECC or details are mentioned, however. Normoyle [104] and Wong et al. [146]
generate checksums over the address and later XOR this information in with
the DECC check bits. Normoyle generates a 4-bit CRC checksum from the
address and merges it with 2 DECC nibbles, which results in a detectable-
but-uncorrectable error in 4-bit symbol SSC-DSD codes. Wong merges a 1-bit
address parity into at least two check bits for similar capabilities in SEC-DED
codes.
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An alternative mechanism, combined ECC, combines the address with
the data prior to ECC encoding. Chen et al. [22, 23] describe a linear code that
accepts the address along with the data and encodes them together for either a
140 or 146-bit channel, providing relatively weak address protection but taking
special care to correctly diagnose address errors in most cases. Vogt [143]
appends the address to the data before encoding, with no consideration of ECC
specifics or correct address error diagnosis. The same approach was studied by
Gumpertz for checking a variety of metadata, including the storage address [34]
(also mentioned in [35]). The concept is described with respect to SEC-DED
ECC and is not evaluated in the context of off-chip memory. Sazeides et
al. [121] describe a scheme to combine metadata with ECC, but they do not
consider address errors or off-chip memory. Normoyle and Hathaway [105] first
take a CRC of the address and then append it and other metadata to the data
before encoding.
Protection of Control Signals: The protection of control signals through
separate ECC has been proposed, trading transmission bandwidth for reliabil-
ity [110, 114]. Partial protection of the DRAM command stream through his-
tory tracking is proposed by Wang [144] and an abandoned patent application
by Romdhane [31]. These approaches check for illegal command sequences or
timing violations without requiring any additional signals to or from memory,
but they cannot provide complete protection against command and control
errors.
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Relationship of Prior Work with AI-ECC: AI-ECC is designed to put
the CCCA reliability mechanisms present in DDR4 [60] to good use in a co-
hesive and comprehensive protection scheme; its relationship with this work
is clear and intentional. AI-ECC further protects the ADD signal by concate-
nating it with the data before encoding, similar to [143, 34]. AI-ECC is the
first approach that considers strong levels of protection (100% address error
detection with detailed error diagnosis for address transmission errors) and
represents the first realistic evaluation of a combined ECC protection scheme
for off-chip memory.
The CSTC proposed for AI-ECC is similar in principle to the mech-
anisms described by [31, 144], yet is more complete. AI-ECC is the first to
evaluate the coverage of protocol tracking, and it augments the approach to
provide the complete coverage of command errors by extending the DDR4 CA
parity signal to fill gaps (such as a missing WR command).
When taken as a whole, AI-ECC both combines and extends the best
aspects of prior CCCA protection efforts. No other approach simultaneously
protects against data, address, clock, and command errors with error coverage
as high as AI-ECC. AI-ECC also performs early write error detection, is
able to correctly diagnose address errors, and it does not require additional
redundancy or new signals to and from DRAM.
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5.6 Summary
All-inclusive ECC is a readily-implementable suite of complementary
error protection mechanisms for DRAM data and CCCA signals. Evaluation
results demonstrate that data ECC, the DDR4 reliability mechanisms, and ad-
dress protection similar to that which may be used by industry are insufficient
for the complete end-to-end protection of DRAM; AI-ECC supplements these
current practices to provide strong holistic protection and enables more ag-
gressive growth in transfer rates. Despite its advantages, AI-ECC has minimal
associated costs and requires no new signals to or from memory, no additional




Efficient Protection using Compression
Memory protection trades off redundant storage, bandwidth, and en-
ergy for increased reliability. DRAM ECC typically employs ECC DIMMs
that have 12.5% more chips than non-ECC DIMMs; hence ECC typically adds
12.5% capacity, bandwidth, and energy overheads. Strong SDDC protection
increases the energy consumption even further by necessitating compromises in
memory system design; such as using narrow ×4 devices or using wide 128-bit
channels.
This chapter presents a versatile and efficient ECC solution, called
Frugal ECC (FECC) that offsets the ECC overheads through fine-grained
compression. In conventional single-tiered ECC organizations, redundant in-
formation is stored in dedicated memory devices that are accessed together
with the devices that store data (Figure 6.1a). In this way, ECC does not
impact performance when compared to unprotected memory. FECC com-
presses main memory at cache-block granularity, using any leftover space to
























(b) An overview of Frugal ECC.
Figure 6.1: A comparison between Frugal ECC and existing ECC.
store ECC information. Compressed data and its ECC information are then
frequently read with a single access even without redundant memory chips;
insufficiently compressed blocks require additional storage and accesses (Fig-
ure 6.1b). FECC attempts to approach the performance and reliability of the
conventional single-tiered organizations while at the same time reduce ECC
overheads and enable more code design flexibility. As examples, this chapter
presents SDDC ECCs on a non-ECC DIMM with ×4 chips and the first true
SDDC ECC for ×8 devices using an ECC DIMM.
6.1 Frugal ECC
Figure 6.2 provides an overview of how FECC works. On a memory
write, FECC losslessly compresses a data block to remove data-inherent re-
dundancy and free up space. If FECC successfully creates enough space for




























Figure 6.2: Memory reads and writes with Frugal ECC using a 64-bit non-ECC
DIMM.
are stored in the memory footprint of the uncompressed data. As its starting
address does not change, a compressible memory block can still be randomly
accessed and no additional address translation procedure or level of indirec-
tion is needed. Furthermore, as with a conventional ECC, both data and
redundant ECC information are accessed in unison. On a memory read, ECC
checking and decompression occur in parallel as ECC is computed on the com-
pressed data. If no errors are detected, the decompressed data is forwarded to
the last-level cache. Otherwise, ECC attempts to recover any lost data and
decompression repeats using the corrected data.
Not all blocks can be compressed to the reduced footprint needed for
ECC. Memory blocks that fail to meet the compression threshold for a given
ECC scheme result in a compression exception. Upon a compression exception,
FECC uses one full block and one partial block to store the uncompressed
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data and ECC check bits. Each compression exception degrades performance,
because both the write and any future read require two (potentially cached)
accesses to memory instead of the single access used in a conventional ECC
design.
As the ECC layouts for compressed and exception data differ, some
ECC meta-data is used to identify whether compression was successful and to
determine the resulting ECC layout. FECC stores the ECC flag that indicates
which layout is used along with the compressed data and applies an additional
level of error protection to the flag—this higher level of protection is necessary
because a compromised ECC flag indicates that a wrong set of bits should be
treated as ECC information; using incorrect bits for ECC decoding degrades
the protection level. FECC therefore uses a 3 to 5-bit ECC flag, as described
further in Section 6.3.
FECC statically reserves enough storage for its overflow data and ac-
cesses this overflow storage as-needed using a deterministic addressing scheme.
After a read, if the ECC flag identifies an exception, FECC deterministically
generates the address of its overflow data and checks the Last Level Cache
(LLC). Upon a miss, FECC fetches the overflow data from DRAM (similar
to VECC [151]). The resulting worst-case latency is the LLC miss penalty
plus the round-trip delay between the memory controller and LLC, but LLC
caching reduces the latency in the common case.
The key to the success of FECC is a design that minimizes excep-
tions while maintaining enough redundancy to meet reliability goals. As such,
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FECC requires both state-of-the-art compression and ECC schemes. The fol-
lowing sections present a novel compression scheme, Coverage-oriented Com-
pression, to increase compression coverage far beyond what is possible with
prior compression techniques and also describe how FECC can utilize the most
aggressive available ECC schemes.
6.2 Coverage-oriented Compression
While most existing compression schemes focus on improving the com-
pression ratio, compressing data to a size as small as possible, left-over space
from an over-compression is left unused in FECC. In the meantime, com-
pression exceptions due to under-compression cost FECC additional mem-
ory accesses for overflow data, consuming additional latency, bandwidth, and
energy. Therefore, FECC relies on a novel compression scheme, Coverage-
oriented Compression (CoC), which focuses on maximizing coverage for the
modest compression ratio goals needed for ECC.
The fundamental observation behind CoC is that there are tradeoffs be-
tween compression ratio and compression coverage. A conventional compression-
ratio-oriented compression assigns short codes to the most frequent values to
reduce the average number of bits needed to store a value. A key drawback of
this assignment is that the number of available “good” codes runs out quickly.
Coverage-oriented compression, on the other hand, tries to cover as many val-
ues as possible with “acceptable” codes to maximize coverage. For example,
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Figure 6.4: The compressed data layout for the 480-bit target (32-bit redun-
dancy).
frequent 2m values, so that all of these values can be compressed into an m-bit
footprint.
CoC has three main components that together maximize coverage with
acceptable implementation overheads: 1) fitting base + delta compression for
homogeneously-typed data, 2) exponent compression for floating-point data,
and 3) frequent word pattern compression for heterogeneously-typed data.
These three components are described in detail below.
6.2.1 Fitting Base + Delta Compression
If a data block has homogeneously-typed data, values within the block
are likely to have similar values. Base-Delta-Immediate (BDI) compression
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exploits this small dynamic range of integer and pointer types by storing the
first value as a base and compressing all the other values as small differences
from this base [113]. For blocks with mixed integer and pointer types, BDI
adds another base value (implicitly assumed to be 0) that is used for integers
while the original base is employed for pointers.
CoC extends the Base-Delta compression of BDI and increases delta
sizes so that the overall compressed size fits within the modest thresholds
needed for FECC. The top 4 organizations in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show
the layouts used to represent integer data when targeting 448-bit and 480-bit
layouts, respectively. The 448-bit and 480-bit compressed sizes yield room for
64-bit and 32-bit redundancy, respectively and reserve 5-bit for ECC layout
information (Section 6.3).
Each organization includes the compression flag to indicate the type
of compression used, a base value, and a set of deltas. The 448-bit footprint
is used to hold a compression flag (up to 4-bit) and a 64-bit base value. The
remaining 375 bits are used to store deltas for the other 7 64-bit values in
the block, which allows 54-bit deltas for 4 of the 7 64-bit values and 53-bit
deltas for 3 of the 7 64-bit values. By fully utilizing every bit of the available
footprint, Fitting Base+Delta (FBD) supports large delta sizes and compresses
more cache lines without exceptions. For 64-bit data, the delta sizes are large
enough to compress a mixture of 64-bit integers and 64-bit pointers without
the need for a separate base for pointers. FBD follows similar reasoning for
maximizing delta sizes to fit within the compression footprint for 32-bit, 16-bit,
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and 8-bit integers, as shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4.
6.2.2 Floating-point Compression
Low-latency floating-point (FP) compression is difficult, as the nor-
malized floating-point significand can cause small value changes to manifest
as a very different binary representation. As the target compression ratio in
FECC is low (8:7 compression for 12.5% redundancy), FP compression in CoC
only targets the exponent and sign of floating-point data. These fields often
have higher value locality and comprise a larger number of bits than FECC
compression goals (18.8% and 28.1% of double and single-precision numbers,
respectively [52]). Similar to the use of delta coding for integer values, CoC can
compress the sign and exponent with simple subtraction assuming that their
values exhibit locality. The bottom organizations in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4
show how CoC compress homogeneously-typed floating-point data using FBD
compression.
The 448-bit footprint is used to hold a 1-bit compression flag and a
64-bit base value with the remaining 378 bits evenly split to represent the
7 remaining FP values. Each 54-bit value represents the 1-bit original sign,
52-bit original mantissa, and a 1-bit exponent delta from the exponent of the
base. While a 1-bit delta can cover only +0 and -1 changes in the exponent,
Section 6.5.2 demonstrates good coverage with this scheme across a range
of applications. For single-precision floating-point numbers, the delta size is
increased to 3 or 4 bits, because our experiments show a need for a larger range
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of exponent differences. For the 480b compression target (32-bit redundancy
for ECC), the compressed size for double-precision FP increases to 58 or 59
bits and CoC uses the additional bits to represent 6 or 7-bit exponent deltas.
6.2.3 Frequent Word Compression
While FBD provides high compression coverage for homogeneously-
type data, it suffers from suboptimal coverage with heterogeneously-typed data
(e.g., structs and classes). In particular, FBD works poorly with heterogeneously-
typed data with mixed fixed and floating-point numbers, as no single base is
appropriate.
To augment this weakness, CoC employs a secondary compression scheme,
called Frequent Word Compression (FWC), that compresses at the 64-bit gran-
ularity. Each 64-bit data is compressed as either a frequent pattern [12] or as a
difference from a previous 64-bit data within its block. The per-word compres-
sor suite in FWC is selected from a large pool of compressors with different
bases, bit positions, and delta sizes. As per-word compression is designed to
complement FBD, SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite (using “test” inputs)
is run to collect the blocks that are incompressible with FBD for the 448-
bit target. Then, the top 16 compressors based on their estimated coverage
are selected with IDs based on Huffman coding [46] to reduce the necessary
amount of meta-data. Section 6.5.2 shows that this choice of compressors and
encoding is robust across other benchmark suites and inputs. Table 6.1 shows
the complete list of the selected compressors.
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Description Size (bits) ID
All zero 64-bit 0 001
Same as left 64-bit 0 1000
Same as left-left 64-bit 0 111110
Same as left-left-left-left 64-bit 0 11110
32-bit data, 32-bit zero 32 11010
2 x {16-bit sign-extension to 32-bit} 32 11011
32-bit sign-extension 32 1010
48-bit sign-extension 48 11100
44-bit delta from left 64-bit 44 11101
52-bit delta from left 64-bit 52 1001
12-bit delta from left-left 64-bit 12 1011
sign, exponent([63:52]) as 4-bit delta from bias (1023) 56 010
sign, exponent([63:52]) as 8-bit delta from bias (1023) 60 011
sign, exponent([63:52]) as 4-bit delta from left 64-bit 56 1100
Exponent([62:52]) as 3-bit delta from bias (1023) 56 111111
Incompressible 64-bit 64 000
Table 6.1: The frequent word compression mappings (per 64-bit data).
6.3 ECC Flag Protection
The ECC flag in FECC identifies which of several possible ECC layouts
is used for a particular block; the specific layout depends on the code design
and the level of compression achieved for a given block. In current designs,
FECC aims to free up either 64 bits or 32 bits of data for ECC; the terms
full and half-compression are used to denote whether the full 64 bits needed
for some ECCs are freed or whether only half that amount are reclaimed,
respectively. An error in the ECC flag can lead to undetected errors because
data will be interpreted as ECC information or vice versa.
Different FECC schemes require a different number of possible layouts.
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If there are only two layouts (uncompressed / compressed), triple-modular-
redundancy can be used to encode the 1-bit ECC flag; the flag is replicated
twice and a majority vote between the 3 copies determines its value (Fig-
ure 6.6). If there are three layouts (uncompressed / half-compressed / fully-
compressed), three different ECC flags are needed. To guarantee correction
from a single bit error on the flag, the 3 codewords are different in at least 3
bits (with a Hamming distance of 3) and codewords of 4 or 5 bits are used
(Figure 6.5). In all cases, the bits used to store the ECC flag are distributed
over different chips so that a chip error corrupts only a single bit of the en-
coded flag, and is therefore correctable. If two chip errors compromise a flag,
a wrong data layout may be selected for decoding. However, even in this case,
the codes used by FECC have very high detection coverage so that decoding
with incorrect layout is very likely to result in a detected error.
6.4 Frugal ECC Organizations
FECC can flexibly trade off performance for error protection using dif-
ferent ECC schemes and by changing its target compression threshold. Several
compelling configurations are presented in following subsections.
6.4.1 Frugal ECC for x4 SDDC
FECC can employ ×4 SDDC ECCs to provide the same level of protec-
tion and a similar level of performance without the use of redundant memory
















































AMD chipkill 72-bit 1 chip correct 12.50% 12.50% None
Bamboo QPC 72-bit 1 chip correct 12.50% 12.50% None
FECC+Multi 64-bit Almost 1 chip correct 0.00% 7.25% R/W (exception)
FECC+QPC 64-bit 1 chip correct 0.00% 13.50% R/W (exception)
Table 6.2: A comparison of different SDDC and SDDC-level ECCs for ×4
devices over a 64-bit data channel.
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tection mechanisms with and without FECC. AMD chipkill [9] and Bamboo
QPC (Section 3.3) are used as examples of ×4 SDDC. Both schemes require
12.5% redundancy (8 bits on a 64-bit channel) and FECC can provide this
space by compressing a 512-bit block into 443 bits of data and 5 bits for the
ECC flag. This 448b compression target determines the rate of compression ex-
ceptions, and thus the impact on performance. Therefore, to minimize perfor-
mance degradation even further, the ECC schemes are treated as a two-tiered
ECC [151] with a 6.25%-redundancy first-tier error code (T1EC) that can de-
tect any single-chip error and a second-tier 6.25%-redundancy code (T2EC)
that can correct any such error.1
If a block compresses to the 448-bit threshold, the T1EC and T2EC
check bits are stored along with compressed data in the original uncompressed
data footprint. If a block is half-compressed to a size in between 448 and 480
bits (including the 5b ECC flag), the T1EC is stored along with compressed
data but the T2EC is stored in a separate block. If a block fails to compress
to even a 480-bit footprint, part of the uncompressed data is stored along with
the T1EC and T2EC in a separate memory block. These organizations are
depicted in Figure 6.5. Note that the ECC flag is protected using a 4 or 5-bit
encoding to ensure true SDDC reliability—even if a chip with ECC flag has
errors, the ECC flag will be correctly decoded.
Multi-ECC [55] was published as SDDC-level protection for ×8 DRAM
1The T2EC code must be combined with the T1EC to correct a single-chip error. It is







OPC 144-bit 1 chip correct 12.50% 12.50% None
VECC 144-bit 1 chip correct - 2 chip detect 12.50% 18.75% W
VECC 128-bit 1 chip correct - 2 chip detect 0.00% 18.75% R/W
LOT-ECC 72-bit Most 1 chip correct 12.50% 26.50% None
Multi-ECC 72-bit Almost 1 chip correct 12.50% 12.90% W
FECC+OPC 72-bit 1 chip correct 12.50% 26.00% R/W (exception)
FECC+Multi 64-bit Almost 1 chip correct 0% 13.50% R/W (exception)
Table 6.3: A comparison of different SDDC and SDDC-level ECCs for ×8
devices.
devices through erasure coding. It uses one redundant symbol to detect any
single ×8 chip error and employs a separate checksum (which is shared among
multiple lines to amortize storage overheads) to locate the faulty chip. Once
the error location is identified, it uses erasure coding with the previous one-
symbol redundancy to correct the error. For ×4 SDDC FECC, Multi-ECC
is modified to build a 16-bit RS symbol from 4 data transfer beats, reducing
its main ECC redundancy down to 6.25%; the same checksum mechanism is
maintained as in the original Multi-ECC design. FECC with ×4 Multi-ECC
can access any block that is compressed to a 480-bit footprint without accessing
secondary storage. In the case of a compression exception, the data and its
ECC information are split over two blocks. This is depicted in Figure 6.6. The
ECC flag for Multi-ECC is protected using a 3-bit encoding because it has only
two ECC layouts and triplicating the 1-bit flag can correct a single-bit error.
137
6.4.2 Frugal ECC for ×8 SDDC
The amount of redundancy required for the ×8 true SDDC (Bamboo
OPC or S8SC in Section 3.3) over a narrow channel is 25%; 16 bits on 64-bit
data channel. As CoC primarily focuses on 12.5% redundancy, FECC uses
ECC-DIMMs with 12.5% redundant devices to split the 25% ECC overhead
between the redundant chips and the space made available by compression.
FECC with OPC uses a two-tiered ECC so that if a block is compressed to less
than 448 bits (443 bits of data and the 5-bit ECC flag), the compressed data
and the 128 bits of redundant information (T1EC + T2EC) is stored within
a single block of an ECC DIMM. If a 512-bit block is compressible to 512 bits
(some blocks fail due to compression and ECC flag overheads), the ECC flag,
compressed data, and 64-bit T1EC are stored on the ECC DIMM. In this case,
a write accesses an additional memory location for the T2EC but error-free
reads require only a single memory access. If compression fails entirely, part
of the uncompressed data, the T1EC, and T2EC are stored across the ECC
chip and also in a separate memory block.
The ×8 SDDC-level Multi-ECC requires 12.5% redundancy; 8 bits on
64-bit data channel. FECC solely uses its 12.5% compression (448-bit target)
to yield room for the redundancy without resorting to ECC DIMMs.
6.5 Evaluation
To understand the benefits of FECC and the tradeoffs involved, this
section evaluates its reliability, performance impact, and energy efficiency in
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comparison to competing ECC schemes (including current commercial ap-
proaches as well as academic designs). First, it measures the protection cover-
age against chip failures to show FECC can maintain SDDC protection despite
the reduced overheads. Then, the effectiveness of CoC is demonstrated to be
both an excellent match for the goals of FECC and superior to previously
published compression mechanisms in this context. Section 6.5.3 presents the
significant energy and performance gains of FECC over existing approaches,
and Section 6.5.4 shows the hardware cost of CoC is acceptable.
For the reliability, performance, and energy consumption evaluation,
14 ECC configurations are evaluated. The two commercial configurations
are the S4SC-D4SD on a 144b channel (strong SDDC similar to [29]) and
the AMD chipkill on a 72b channel, both with ×4 DRAM devices. Virtual-
ized ECC [151] is evaluated with 136b and 128b channels for ×4 devices and
144b and 128b channels for ×8 devices and follows the configuration described
in Section 6.6. The SDDC-level schemes (i.e., LOT-ECC [141] and Multi-
ECC) are also evaluated. Finally, four FECC variants are evaluated: SDDC
FECC+QPC and SDDC-level FECC+Multi-ECC on 64b channels with ×4
devices, SDDC FECC+OPC on a 72b channel with ×8 devices, and SDDC-
level FECC+Multi-ECC on a 64b channel with ×8 devices. Note that the
FECC configurations have the smallest number of redundant DRAM devices,
with the exception of the 128b VECC configurations, though VECC is only
defined for wide channels. Also note that the 72b FECC+OPC is, to the best
of our knowledge, the only true SDDC ECC that can use both a 72b channel
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and ×8 DRAM devices.
For the compression coverage, performance impact, and energy con-
sumption evaluation, the SPEC CPU 2006 [130, 39], PARSEC [3, 18], SPLASH2X2 [147,
111], and NAS Parallel Benchmarks suites3 are used.
6.5.1 Reliability
The reliability of SDDC and SDDC-level ECCs are evaluated using
random error injection simulations (Section 3.4). Figure 6.7 and 6.8 show the
rank-level and system-level reliability evaluation results, respectively. ECC
flag protection is evaluated assuming blocks are fully-compressed/half-compressed/
uncompressed with 70/20/10% probabilities, respectively. Due to the lack of
decoding details, S4SC-D4SD is omitted from these results.
LOT-ECC and Multi-ECC are not true SDDC techniques and exhibit
errors even with only single-chip errors (Section 6.6). LOT-ECC uses a 7-
bit checksum at a chip granularity and thus exhibits a high SDC probability,
which is particularly problematic for large systems (Figure 6.8). Multi-ECC
with ×8 devices has a 2-16 probability of uncorrectable errors per codeword;
with 2 codewords per 512b block, the probability of a DUE is 2-15. Despite this
problematic protection for single-device errors, the overall reliability result of
Multi-ECC is very close to that of the other good SDDC-level ECCs, such as
2SPLASH2X is an update of the SPLASH2 benchmark suite [147] with larger input
sets [111]. It is distributed as part of PARSEC v3.0 [3].
3While the majority of benchmarks are evaluated, some programs are omitted due to






































































































































































































































128b data 64b data 128b data 64b data 128b data 64b data 128b data 64b data



















































































































































































































































Figure 6.8: Probabilities of a DUE and SDC for a system with 100K DIMMs,
assuming only 1 or 2-chip errors.
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AMD chipkill and QPC, because the fault model does lead to some errors that
span two or more chips. Importantly, FECC shows almost identical protection
as the underlying ECC code it utilizes (i.e., QPC, OPC, or Multi×8), despite
using fewer devices. In fact, the best overall protection in terms of both
the DUE and SDC rates is provided by FECC+OPC, as it relies on fewer
devices and therefore exhibits fewer faults, assuming only the faults reported
by Sridharan and Liberty [128] can occur.
6.5.2 Compression Coverage
The compressibility of benchmark memory traffic and the effectiveness
of coverage-oriented compression are evaluated using a Pin-based [92] cache
model that implements CoC compression at the main memory interface. Serial
program versions are used, with a weighted average over all program invoca-
tions taken in the case of fork-based multi-programmed benchmarks. Every
main memory read and write-back is compressed4 and its size tallied.
Figure 6.9 shows the overall compression coverage results. Because
of the data dependence of CoC, the compression coverage experiments are
conducted over a wide variety of benchmarks and input sets. Benchmarks
are sorted within each suite by descending memory traffic and the harmonic
mean behavior for each benchmark suite is given by a corresponding HM col-
4Stratified sampling [149] is used to reduce the experimental runtime of SPEC with
the “ref” input set and PARSEC/SPLASH2X with the “native” input sets. Fast-forward,
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E/T/R in SPECCPU stand for test/train/ref input set.
T/D/S/M/L/N in PARSEC stand for test/dev/small/medium/large/native input set.
S/W/A/B in NPB stand for small/workstation/A/B input set.
S/M/L/N in SPLASH2X stand for small/medium/large/native input set.
Figure 6.9: An evaluation on CoC compression coverage for 64-bit and 32-bit
redundancy.
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umn. It can be seen that CoC compresses most benchmarks well, with many
benchmarks resulting in ≥ 99% compression coverage. In general, integer
benchmarks compress sufficiently down to the 448b compression target, while
many floating-point benchmarks must resort to the 480b level of compression.
This is not unexpected, since the compressibility of floating-point numbers is
limited (see Section 6.2.2 for more details).
The proper compression target varies according to the target ECC
scheme. On a 64b rank with ×4 DRAM chips, FECC+Multi uses a 480b
target coverage for both reads and writes and FECC+QPC uses a 448b target
fully-compressed blocks and 480b for half-compressed blocks. On a 72b rank
with ×8 DRAM chips, FECC+Multi uses a 448b target and FECC+OPC
uses 448b and 512b targets full-compressed and half-compressed blocks, re-
spectively. Note that Figure 6.9 gives results only on a 64b rank; compression
coverage trends over a 72b rank are similar but they are not shown in the
interest of brevity.
While most benchmarks and input sets compress satisfactorily with
CoC, a few benchmarks show more lackluster compressibility. Ferret performs
a content-based similarity search of images using JPEG images as query inputs.
The inherent compressibility of these images is poor, perhaps leading to the
low CoC coverage. Similarly, VIPS is an image processing system. Within
PARSEC, the input images to VIPS are formatted in a native file format [4]
and they happen to encode pixels in a non-IEEE754 floating-point format




































































































































































































































Figure 6.10: A compression coverage comparison between CoC and prior mem-
ory compression schemes.
Sjeng is an artificial intelligence program for chess. It makes heavy use of
heterogeneous mixed-size data structures and it is expected that the data
structures are not aligned or coalesced properly for CoC to fully capture the
value locality within them. 64b-level compression does adapt somewhat to
the heterogeneous nature of Sjeng—without it the compression coverage is
dismal instead of lackluster, and enabling word-level compression increases
the coverage by 5.54× and 6.25× at 448b and 480b, respectively. Perlbench
is heavily multi-programmed through repeated forks; some of these program
invocations are highly compressible and others compress poorly.
The average compressibility of programs in Figure 6.9 is high; this
high compression coverage is a direct result of coverage-oriented compression




























Figure 6.11: The memory traffic and compression coverage results of all bench-
marks measured with Pin and the four representative detailed simulations se-
lected.
sion approaches. Figure 6.10 demonstrates this through compression coverage
experiments for PARSEC and NPB using BDI [113] and FPC [12] compres-
sion as well as fitting base + delta compression alone, which represents CoC
without word-granularity compression. The results show that CoC always per-
forms as well or better than the best of the other approaches, in some cases
(like LU) outperforming all others. It is also readily apparent how insufficient
BDI and FPC compression are for floating-point data—the floating-point com-
pressors used for Frugal ECC are necessary for HPC benchmark suites such
as NPB. Correspondingly, the compression approach used by Free ECC (com-
bining BDI and FPC) [25] would not suffice for a large range of benchmark
programs.
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6.5.3 Performance and Energy
The performance impact and DRAM energy consumption of the differ-
ent ECC schemes are estimated using the Gem5 simulator [1] and the Micron
DDR3 power model [95]. Because of the long runtime of the simulator, not all
the benchmarks used in compression analysis are evaluated for performance.
Instead, four benchmarks are selected to represent different points in the space
of parameter values that most-strongly impact the performance and energy be-
havior of FECC; off-chip data bandwidth (or last-level cache misses) and the
frequency of compression exceptions. Figure 6.11 depicts how the benchmarks
in coverage evaluation map across these two dimensions.
Sphinx from SPEC 2006 (denoted SPEC.spx) is chosen as representa-
tive of benchmarks with low traffic and high compression coverage, which are
ideal for FECC. Libquantum from SPEC 2006 (SPECFP.lq) and EP from
NPB (NPB.ep) are representative of benchmarks with high coverage / high
traffic and low coverage / low traffic, respectively; both of which are expected
to also perform well with FECC. As an example for an application that stresses
FECC, SP from NPB (NPB.sp) is tested, which has poor compression cover-
age and also significant traffic. Note that these cases do not precisely match
the extreme points observed with the Pin-based evaluation, but they are the
closest ones found in detailed simulation.
The detailed single-core simulation parameters are summarized in Ta-
ble 6.4. For FECC, CoC compression and decompression are assumed to have
2 memory cycle latency (Section 6.5.4), while ECC encoding and decoding
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Core 2GHz OoO core, 16KB L1I, 64KB L1D
LLC
2MB L2, 8-way (7-way for Multi-ECC) w/ stride prefetcher
20-cycle hit latency, 20 MSHR entries (40 for VECC, Multi-ECC, and FECC)
DRAM
DDR3-1600, 2 rank, 2 channel for 64b data and 1 channel for 128b data
RD data FIFO lat. WR data FIFO lat.
AMD CK, S4SC-D4SD, VECC,
and Multi-ECC
+1 +1
QPC, OPC, and LOT-ECC +4 +4
FECC+Multi +2 +3
FECC+QPC and FECC+OPC +4 +5
Simulation 400M cycles after 800M cycles of fast-forwarding
Table 6.4: The simulation parameters for the performance and energy evalu-
ation.
after the necessary data are fully available take 1 cycle. While multi-core
simulations are more realistic and put more pressure on memory bandwidth,
single-core simulations are used because FECC degrades performance mostly
due to its extra latency and because single-core results allow for a clearer pre-
sentation of behavior and insights. The baseline IPC and DRAM energy are
measured in the AMD chipkill configuration; the four benchmarks have 0.82
IPC / 0.23J for Libquantum, 1.33 IPC / 0.12J for Sphinx3, 1.24 IPC / 0.13J
for NPB.ep, and 1.71 IPC / 0.10J for NPB.sp.
Figure 6.12 shows the estimated execution time and DRAM energy
consumption over the chosen simulation interval of the selected benchmarks.
Execution times are shown in bars (left y-axis) normalized to the AMD chipkill
configuration and the relative energy is shown as lines (right y-axis). As ex-
pected, the FECC configurations exhibit essentially no impact on performance
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with the ideal SPEC.spx and also with the low-traffic NPB.ep.
The performance of SPEC.lq is impacted by type of code used and
channel width, but as expected, the addition of FECC has a negligible impact
(< 1%) because of the high compression coverage. The only configuration for
which FECC has a measurable impact is for NPB.sp, which has meaningful
traffic and poor compression coverage; the 64b FECC+Multi configuration
exhibits a 3.7% performance degradation because it requires a 480b level of
compression for all reads and writes. FECC+OPC does not show a similar
degradation because it relies on a 72b channel and does not add any latency
for read operations, regardless of the compression achieved.
Energy results show that DRAM energy consumption varies more dra-
matically, from 1.98× down to 0.44×, among SDDC-level schemes. The main
reason for the variation is the number of DRAM devices per access; the most
energy inefficient configuration is 144b channel with ×8 devices (i.e., S4SC-
D4SD with 36 devices) and the most efficient one is a 64b channel with ×8
devices (i.e., FECC+Multi-ECC with 8 devices). SPEC.lq with high data
traffic and high locality benefits from the 128B cache lines and its reduced
execution time lessens DRAM energy cost. FECC variants improves energy
efficiency over their non-frugal counterparts: up to 11% in FECC+Multi-ECC.
FECC+OPC is the only SDDC protection that that can use both a 72b chan-
nel and ×8 devices, and because of this it requires only about half the energy
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Figure 6.12: A comparison of execution time and DRAM energy consumption














































Figure 6.13: A block diagram of the CoC compressor.
6.5.4 Hardware Overheads
CoC compression requires some hardware to compress and decompress
each memory transfer; yet they require a very small amount of chip area and
are readily implementable in the 2-cycle latency assumed by the performance
and energy evaluation. Figure 6.13 shows an overview of the compression
process, broken into two stages. The first stage implements the block and
word-granularity compressors through subtraction and equality testing. The
output of this first-stage logic is the compressed data for each constituent
compressor and the validity of each compression (whether it captures all of
the data in its allotted space). This compressor and validity data is fed into
a second stage that chooses the most appropriate compressor and outputs the
final result.
The first-stage compressor logic is expected to consume the majority
of the area for the CoC compressor. A straightforward, behavioral implemen-
tation of this first-stage logic easily achieves a 1ns latency. The block and
word compressors consume areas equivalent to 4,383 and 5,866 NAND2 gates,
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respectively.5 Combined, the block and word compressors consume about 25%
more chip area than a single 32-bit fixed-point multiplier—an insignificant area
compared to an entire processor.
The second compressor stage consists of a priority encoder with a small
amount of ID generation logic, and is expected to easily and cheaply fit within
the remaining 1ns of compression latency. The CoC decompressor is expected
to consume less area than the compressor, because it does not need to spec-
ulatively perform all constituent compression schemes in parallel and can ef-
fectively use less internal arithmetic. Also, because decompression uses addi-
tion instead of subtraction for all delta operations, logic sharing between the
different-width compression schemes should be a straightforward and poten-
tially worthwhile optimization.
6.6 Related Work
This section reviews recent accomplishments in ECC and main memory
compression that are closely related to FECC but not described above.
6.6.1 Efficient ECC
There is wealth of prior research that focuses on efficiency of memory
protection. Recent ECC approaches attempt to improve reliability while stay-
5These delay and area estimates are found through standard-cell synthesis using the
Synopsys toolchain and the 40nm TSMC standard cell library [135, 136] but are presented
in a technology-independent manner.
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ing within the bounds of acceptable system parameters (i.e., 64-bit memory
data channels and near-12.5% redundant storage and bandwidth) by intro-
ducing new reliability and performance tradeoffs [28, 36, 151, 141, 55, 9]. One
example is the use of ECCs that do not precisely match the definition of SDDC
but still correct the vast majority of single chip errors [141, 55]; this class of
protection is referred as SDDC-level. Another example is the use of multi-
tiered codes in which a first ECC code is used for detection and a second
code is used for correction [151, 141, 55]. This section lists some of the most
important and efficient SDDC and SDDC-level ECC schemes with focuses on
multi-tiered ECCs.
SDDC ECCs for ×4 DRAM Devices: Virtualized ECC (VECC) [151]
provides SDDC protection on a wider variety of memory module organizations
using its multi-tiered protection. VECC can provide ×4 SDDC protection on
a 128-bit data interface (two non-ECC DIMMS), by virtualizing and storing
3 check symbols elsewhere in the memory space as data. Two separate ac-
cesses are required for each access to memory—one for data and the other for
redundancy—though caching the ECC information is often effective and helps
to reduce the performance impact of the additional memory traffic. Alterna-
tively, VECC can separate the codes used for error detection and correction
and can use a 136-bit data interface (built from one 72-bit ECC DIMM and
one 64-bit non-ECC DIMM) to provide SDDC protection without needing
two accesses in the common case. In this organization, VECC virtualizes
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a one-symbol error correcting code and stores it elsewhere in the memory
space as data, but this secondary code needs only be accessed in the rare case
when errors are detected (or upon a memory write, as it must be updated).
Other approaches exist, similar to VECC, that embed ECC data elsewhere
in the memory space to allow a more flexible use of non-ECC memory mod-
ules [28, 36].
SDDC ECCs for ×8 DRAM Devices: Wider ×8 DRAM chips save en-
ergy by activating fewer chips per memory access for a given data channel
width. However, as a chip failure compromises a larger number of bits, ×8
SDDC is generally more challenging and requires more redundancy than its
×4 counterpart. To correct a ×8 chip error, the minimum redundancy is twice
the correction size [125], giving a minimum of 25% redundancy for a 64-bit
interface and 12.5% for a 128-bit interface.
There are, however, recent academic approaches that target SDDC-
level protection on a narrow channel with ×8 devices and 12.5% redundancy.
LOT-ECC [141] can correct most single chip errors (127
128
or 99.2%) on a 72-
bit ECC DIMM by using a 4-tiered ECC scheme. Due to its use of a 7-bit
error detecting checksum, however, 1
128
of chip errors remain undetected by
LOT-ECC and lead to silent data corruption. Multi-ECC [55] uses an error
localization and erasure code to enable SDDC-level protection on a 72-bit ECC
DIMM with 12.9% redundancy. The error localization procedure of Multi-ECC
is based on a 16-bit checksum, and it fails to identify the faulty symbol with
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2-16 probability, making 2-16 of single chip errors detectable-yet-uncorrectable.
E-ECC [24] relies on error and erasure correction to correct most ×8 device
failures on a single ECC DIMM.
6.6.2 Memory Compression
Memory compression has been actively researched and deployed in
caches and main memory to increase the available memory capacity and re-
duce off-chip traffic. Frequent value compression [150] targets a small set of
2–8 frequent values that collectively occupy over 50% of memory entries in
some benchmarks. It replaces each frequent value by a small index to reduce
space.
Frequent pattern compression [12] targets frequent patterns rather than
frequent values. Most of their patterns are based on the fact that large data
types (e.g., 32 or 64-bit fixed-point numbers) often contain small values that
do not fully utilize their allocated storage. Frequent pattern compression saves
storage by opportunistically converting such values to use smaller data types.
IBM MXT technology [6] is a word-granularity compressor that relies
on a derivative of adaptive dictionary based coding [156] to more than double
the effective main memory capacity. However, the drawbacks of MXT in-
clude a large cache line size (1KB) to amortize its significant dictionary cost,
long compression/decompression latencies from sequential processing and ad-
ditional accesses to locate the compressed data.
Linearly compressed pages (LCP) [112] compresses all cache lines within
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a page to the same size, making address calculation straightforward and avoid-
ing memory fragmentation. Upon a compression exception, LCP allocates
separate regions within the physical page for exception flags and exception
data. If the number of exceptions overflows this allocated storage, LCP traps
to operating system and requests a bigger physical page for the virtual page.
MemZip [123] compresses cache lines for memory traffic reduction, not
for capacity savings. The compressed data are stored in the same footprint as
uncompressed data but memory traffic and energy are reduced on a memory
channel that supports fine-grained rank subsetting. Space savings can also
be used to store meta-data, such as data bus inversion for memory interface
energy saving or ECC for opportunistically stronger protection (though the
potential for ECC is largely unexplored). Other work also employs memory
compression to store optional prefetch hints [89].
Free ECC [25] combines compression and ECC for the last level cache.
Free ECC depends on customized tags to store compression meta-data, how-
ever, and it combines BDI and FPC compression. The lack of dedicated meta-
data storage makes this approach inappropriate for DRAM; Section 6.5 also
shows the ineffectiveness of BDI and FPC alone for a wide range of benchmark
suites.
COP [109] uses compression to enable ECC protection using non-ECC
DIMMs. The specifics of the COP approach make its level of error protec-
tion quite weak—significantly worse than SEC-DED—and preclude it from
being a viable alternative to FECC for high-performance and high-availability
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systems. The COP ECC scheme cannot be extended in a straightforward
manner to SDDC levels of protection, even in its strongest organization, be-
cause the implicit manner in which it tracks the compressibility of a memory
block degrades the coverage of its ECC code. The compression scheme used
by COP also targets 6.25% redundancy and it provides poor compression cov-
erage for the industry-standard 12.5% ECC footprint. There is also a patent
that describes the use of compression with non-ECC DIMMs [132] without
any evaluation or consideration of SDDC-level protection.
Recent research on compression algorithms [76, 101, 13] has demon-
strated higher compression ratios than earlier compression work. FECC’s
unique CoC scheme may utilize the insights from this recent research to im-
prove compression coverage or reduce compressed data footprint further. In
turn, this may enable even more energy-efficient memory configurations (e.g.,
true ×8 SDDC using non-ECC DIMM) while amortizing compression over-
heads with storage and bandwidth reductions.
6.7 Summary
Frugal ECC provides new tradeoffs between reliability, performance,
and efficiency. By combining a novel compression scheme and meta-data en-
coding and management techniques, FECC designs are able to match the
memory access characteristics of conventional ECC designs while requiring
fewer, or even no, redundant DRAM devices. The coverage-oriented compres-
sion technique is carefully co-designed with its intended use and far exceeds
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the capabilities of previously-published fine-grained compression mechanisms,
especially for floating-point intensive programs. The ECC layout can provide





This dissertation presents and evaluates a set of novel memory pro-
tection mechanisms. The mechanisms, taken together, may provide thorough
end-to-end protection of DRAM against existing and emerging types of errors,
while the individual mechanisms are demonstrated to be stronger and safer
than their current state-of-the-art counterparts. Despite their strength, the
proposed mechanisms also improve energy efficiency by reducing redundancy,
eliminating inefficient and separate protection and/or enabling more energy-
efficient configurations. These mechanisms achieve such reliability benefits
with minimal changes to DRAM design and no extra storage and bandwidth
overheads compared to current schemes, making them readily implementable
to influence industry and to change the world.
In Chapter 3, this dissertation develops a new data ECC mechanism,
Bamboo ECC, that can detect most uncorrectable errors and which may allow
future large-scale systems to operate safely without silent data corruptions.
Its strong level of error correction and support for flexible graceful downgrade
schemes can also greatly extend the lifetime of a system by tolerating perma-
nent faults.
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In Chapter 4, this dissertation provides a novel mechanism against
emerging errors from imperfect process scaling. By combining ECC error and
erasure decoding with fault remapping, AG-ECC preserves SDDC reliability
in the presence of frequent inherent faults, while improving manufacturability
without separate in-DRAM ECC protection. Its high reliability, high manufac-
turability and high efficiency may allow DRAM process technology to continue
shrinking despite increasing cell fault rates without requiring modifications to
DRAM chips themselves.
In Chapter 5, this dissertation presents ECCmechanisms against emerg-
ing transmission errors to provide holistic system-level protection. Transmis-
sion errors on the clock, control, command, and address signals are expected to
grow as DRAM transfer rates increase and I/O voltage levels decrease; these
CCCA errors can dominate system reliability after data is strongly protected
by an aggressive ECC. AI-ECC is the first approach to provide strong and
thorough protection against all aspects of this important error type. By aug-
menting existing data protection schemes, AI-ECC does not cost additional
storage and bandwidth overheads and demands minimal changes to DRAM
design. This strong protection may enable more aggressive speedups in DRAM
signal transfers for future throughput-oriented computations.
In Chapter 6, this dissertation improves the energy efficiency of DRAM
protection through fine-grained compression. Frugal ECC can decouple the
amount of redundancy needed for protection and the number of chips needed
for the redundancy, allowing for versatile and more energy-efficient memory
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configurations. With a carefully co-designed compression algorithm and robust
ECC layouts, Frugal ECC provides flexible tradeoffs between energy-efficiency
and performance without degrading the level of error protection.
This dissertation also contributes with its rigorous evaluation of relia-
bility and manufacturability, including the practical impact of ECC detection
coverage, consequences from CCCA errors, manufacturability from inherent
faults, and protection coverage of SDDC-level ECCs.
7.1 Future Research Directions
The key findings of this dissertation can be extended to other memory
products and other compute architectures. Some of the most exciting research
opportunities are presented below.
AG-ECC based on In-DRAM Redundancy: AG-ECC eliminates the
need for a separate in-DRAM ECC by utilizing rank-level ECC against both
inherent and operational faults. For systems that do not employ similar
schemes and systems with low reliability requirements (e.g., personal comput-
ers without rank-level ECC), however, DRAM vendors may produce devices
with in-DRAM ECC only, or sell them at a cheaper price due to economies of
scale.
In such cases, the proposed AG-ECC approach can be redesigned to
rely on the extra cells of in-DRAM ECC, instead of extra chips on the DIMM
for redundancy. With slight changes to the DRAM core and interface, the
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extra cells can be optionally exposed and utilized as rank-level ECC redun-
dancy. Such an idea is promising, as rank-level ECC can provide SDDC-level
protection with fewer or even no redundant chips. The biggest challenge of this
research opportunity is how to deal with the increased level of error severity;
now a dead ×4 chip generates not only up to 32 erroneous data bits but also
up to 4-bit errors in the redundant information.
Protection of Memory with Wider Interface: Research should target
the future, not the present. This dissertation uses DDR4 because it is a con-
crete and well-understood example for which good models exist; a requirement
for a thorough and convincing evaluation. Other architectures, however, em-
ploy different lines of DRAM products (graphics DDR [61, 66], low-power
DDR [57, 63, 64, 67], 3D-stacked memories [62, 58, 65, 49], etc.) to meet their
computation throughput and energy efficiency requirements.
These DRAMs commonly utilize a wider data interface (16- or 32-bit)
than DDR4 (4- or 8-bit) to reduce the number of chips per access and to
improve energy efficiency at the cost of capacity and reliability. The current
practice of using weak SEC-DED [106] provides limited reliability improve-
ments, and it is very important to develop protection mechanisms as reliable
as DDR4 SDDC protection to enable reliable computation using these de-
vices. While ECC alone may be insufficient due to the large number of bit
errors from a chip fault, the safe detection capability of Bamboo ECC may
allow complementary protection schemes to achieve high reliability.
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